

CUSTODY AND VISITATION

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CUSTODY AND VISITATION

I. [§200.1] SCOPE OF BENCHGUIDE

II. PROCEDURAL CHECKLISTS

- A. Jurisdiction Checklists
 - 1. [§200.2] Initial Custody Determinations
 - 2. [§200.3] Emergency Jurisdiction
 - 3. [§200.4] Modification of Out-of-State Order
 - 4. [§200.5] Venue Checklist
- B. [§200.6] Hearing on Order To Show Cause: Custody and Visitation
- C. Move-Away Checklists
 - 1. [§200.7] Initial Custody Determinations
 - 2. [§200.8] Modification of Existing Judicially Determined Custody Order

III. APPLICABLE LAW

- A. Jurisdiction
 - 1. [§200.9] Family Court Proceedings
 - 2. Preemption of Family Court Custody Jurisdiction
 - a. [§200.10] Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
 - b. [§200.11] Tribal Jurisdiction Under Indian Child Welfare Act
 - 3. [§200.12] Interstate Disputes
 - 4. Initial Custody Determinations
 - a. [§200.13] Grounds for Jurisdiction
 - b. [§200.14] California Is Child's Home State
 - c. [§200.15] No Other Home State; California More Appropriate Forum
 - d. [§200.16] Other Courts Having Jurisdiction Deferred to California
 - e. [§200.17] Jurisdiction in No Other Court
 - 5. [§200.18] Declining Exercise of Jurisdiction

- a. [§200.19] Simultaneous Proceedings in Another State
 - b. [§200.20] Inconvenient Forum
 - c. [§200.21] Unjustifiable Conduct of Petitioner
- 6. [§200.22] Emergency Jurisdiction
- 7. Modification Jurisdiction
 - a. [§200.23] Modification of Prior California Order
 - b. [§200.24] Modification of Order of Another State
 - c. [§200.25] Proceeding To Enforce Order in Another State
 - d. [§200.26] Declining Exercise of Jurisdiction To Modify Order
- 8. [§200.27] Venue
- B. Initial Custody Orders
 - 1. [§200.28] Temporary or Pendente Lite Order
 - 2. [§200.29] Ex Parte Order
- C. Types of Custody Orders
 - 1. Overview and Definitions
 - a. [§200.30] Legal and Physical Custody
 - b. [§200.31] Sole Custody
 - c. [§200.32] Joint Custody
 - 2. [§200.33] Presumption and Special Rules Applicable to Joint Custody Orders
- D. Guidelines for Custody Determinations
 - 1. [§200.34] Best Interest of Child
 - a. [§200.35] Child’s Health, Safety, and Welfare
 - b. [§200.36] Contact With Parents
 - c. [§200.37] History of Drug or Alcohol Abuse
 - (1) [§200.38] Corroborative Evidence of Drug or Alcohol Abuse
 - (2) [§200.39] Drug Testing
 - d. [§200.40] History of Physical Abuse
 - (1) [§200.41] Definition of Abuse
 - (2) [§200.42] Corroborative Evidence of Physical Abuse
 - (3) [§200.43] Family Code §3044 Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Domestic Violence Perpetrator
 - (4) [§200.44] Finding Under Fam C §3044
 - (5) [§200.45] Rebutting Fam C §3044 Presumption
 - (6) [§200.46] Child Sexual Abuse Allegations
 - 2. [§200.47] “Frequent and Continuing Contact” With Both Parents
 - 3. [§200.48] Statutory Preferences

4. [§200.49] Child's Need for Bonding, Stability, and Continuity
5. Preference of Child
 - a. [§200.50] In General
 - b. [§200.51] Obtaining Evidence of Child's Preference
6. [§200.52] Party's Absence or Relocation
7. [§200.53] Separation of Siblings
8. [§200.54] Emergency or Protective Orders in Effect
9. Restriction of Custody to Violent Offenders
 - a. [§200.55] Registered Sex Offenders; Child Abusers
 - b. [§200.56] Person Convicted of Rape
 - c. [§200.57] Person Convicted of Murder
10. [§200.58] Improper Factors
- E. Awarding Custody to Nonparent Over Parent's Objection
 1. [§200.59] Detriment Test
 2. [§200.60] Standard of Proof
- F. Visitation Rights
 1. [§200.61] Reasonable Visitation by Parent
 2. [§200.62] Visitation by Incarcerated Parent
 3. [§200.63] Visitation by Nonparents
 - a. [§200.64] *Troxel* Limits on Visitation
 - b. [§200.65] Stepparent Visitation
 - c. [§200.66] Visitation by Relatives of Deceased Parent
 - d. [§200.67] Grandparent Visitation
 - (1) [§200.68] Family Code §3103
 - (2) [§200.69] Family Code §3104
- G. [§200.70] Supervised Visits and Exchanges
 1. [§200.71] Court's Determination of Need and Manner of Visitation
 2. [§200.72] Types of Supervised Visit Providers and Qualifications
 3. [§200.73] Responsibilities of Supervised Visit Providers
- H. Mediation of Custody or Visitation Disputes
 1. [§200.74] General Provisions
 2. [§200.75] Purposes of Mediation
 3. Types of Mediation
 - a. [§200.76] Recommending
 - b. [§200.77] Nonrecommending
 - c. [§200.78] Confidential Mediation Pilot Program in Selected Counties
 4. [§200.79] Mediator's Role
 5. Mediation Procedures
 - a. [§200.80] Notice of Mediation and Hearing
 - b. [§200.81] Confidentiality of Proceedings

- c. [§200.82] Limits of Agreement
- d. [§200.83] Interview of Child
- e. [§200.84] Issuance of Restraining Orders
- f. [§200.85] Appointment of Counsel To Represent Child
- g. Special Procedures When History of Domestic Violence Between Parties
 - (1) [§200.86] Separate Meetings
 - (2) [§200.87] Presence of Support Person
- h. [§200.88] Exclusion of Counsel or Support Person
- 6. [§200.89] Procedure When Agreement Is Reached
- 7. [§200.90] Procedure When Agreement Is Not Reached
- 8. [§200.91] Standards of Practice for Mediation
- I. [§200.92] Court-Ordered Counseling for Parents and Children
 - 1. [§200.93] Goals of Counseling
 - 2. [§200.94] Special Procedure When History of Abuse Between Parties
 - 3. [§200.95] Cost of Counseling
- J. Custody Evaluation and Report
 - 1. [§200.96] Appointment of Evaluator
 - 2. [§200.97] Required Qualifications of Evaluators
 - 3. [§200.98] Duties of Evaluator
 - 4. [§200.99] Special Procedure When History of Domestic Violence Between Parties
 - 5. [§200.100] Investigation of Sexual Abuse Allegations
 - 6. [§200.101] Cost of Investigation
- K. Appointment of Counsel for the Child
 - 1. [§200.102] Request for Appointment
 - 2. [§200.103] Factors for Court To Consider
 - 3. [§200.104] Duties of Appointed Counsel
 - 4. [§200.105] Cost of Appointed Counsel
- L. [§200.106] Appointing Special Master
- M. Child Abduction Prevention
 - 1. [§200.107] Determining Risk of Abduction
 - 2. [§200.108] Preventive Measures
- N. Missing Party or Child
 - 1. [§200.109] Missing Party in Possession of Child
 - 2. [§200.110] Child Taken or Detained
 - 3. [§200.111] Temporary Custody Orders
 - 4. [§200.112] Costs Incurred by District Attorney
 - 5. [§200.113] National Crime Information Center Missing Person System
- O. [§200.114] Modification of Custody

1. [§200.115] Showing of Changed Circumstances
 2. [§200.116] Requirement of a Prior Determination
 3. [§200.117] When Changed Circumstance Rule Does Not Apply
- P. Change of Child’s Residence (“Move-Aways”)
1. [§200.118] Custodial Parent’s Presumptive Right To Move
 2. [§200.119] Reasons for Move
 3. [§200.120] Burden of Proof
 4. [§200.121] Order Conditioning Relocation on Prior Consent
 5. [§200.122] “Frequent and Continuing Contact With Both Parents”
 6. Effect of Move on Initial Custody Determinations
 - a. [§200.123] Best Interest Standard
 - b. [§200.124] Prejudice to Child
 - c. [§200.125] Continuity and Stability in Custody
 7. Move as Ground for Modification of Existing Custody Order
 - a. [§200.126] In General
 - b. [§200.127] Changed Circumstances Rule
 - c. [§200.128] Court’s Discretion in Light of Child’s Best Interest
 - d. [§200.129] Joint Physical Custody
 - e. [§200.130] De Facto Shared Physical Custody
 8. [§200.131] International Move-Aways
 9. [§200.132] Minimizing Effect of Move
- Q. [§200.133] Calendar Preference
- R. [§200.134] Termination of Custody Order

IV. SAMPLE FORMS

- A. [§200.135] Written Form: Order Appointing Counsel for Minor
- B. [§200.136] Written Form: Stipulation and Order for Private Child Custody Evaluation
- C. [§200.137] Written Form: Stipulation and Order for Appointment of Court’s Expert for Custody Evaluation
- D. [§200.138] Written Form: Stipulation and Order for Appointment of Special Master

Appendix: Move-Away Flow Chart**TABLE OF STATUTES****TABLE OF CASES****I. [§200.1] SCOPE OF BENCHGUIDE**

This benchguide addresses child custody and visitation proceedings under the Family Code, specifically the disposition of parent and nonparent claims in marital actions. It also discusses modification of custody and move-away disputes. Discussion of custody and visitation disputes within the context of dependency, guardianship, paternity, and adoption proceedings is beyond the scope of this benchguide.

II. PROCEDURAL CHECKLISTS**A. Jurisdiction Checklists****1. [§200.2] Initial Custody Determinations**

A California court may exercise jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination if (Fam C §3421(a)):

- California is the child’s “home state” when the initial custody proceeding is commenced; or
- It was the child’s home state within six months before the proceeding commenced and the child is absent from California, but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in California;

OR

- No other state has “home state” jurisdiction, or a court of the home state has declined jurisdiction; *and*
- The child and at least one parent or person acting as parent have a significant connection with California other than mere physical presence; *and*
- Substantial evidence is available in California concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

OR

- All courts having jurisdiction have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that California is the more appropriate forum.

OR

- No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the above criteria.

For discussion, see §§200.14–200.17.

2. [§200.3] Emergency Jurisdiction

(1) *A California court may exercise temporary emergency custody jurisdiction if (Fam C §3424(a)):*

- The child is present in this state; *and*
- The child has been “abandoned”; *or*
- The exercise of such jurisdiction is “necessary in an emergency” to protect the child because the child, child’s sibling, or child’s parent is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

For discussion, see §200.22.

3. [§200.4] Modification of Out-of-State Order

A California court may not modify a child custody determination made by another state unless (Fam C §3423):

(a) The California court has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination because:

- California is the child’s “home state” when the initial custody proceeding is commenced; *or*
- It was the child’s home state within six months before the proceeding commenced and the child is absent from California, but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in California;

OR

- No other state has “home state” jurisdiction, or a court of the home state has declined jurisdiction; *and*
- The child and at least one parent or person acting as parent have a significant connection with California other than mere physical presence; *and*
- Substantial evidence is available in California concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

AND

(b) The court of the other state determines:

- It no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or that California would be a more convenient forum; *or*
- The child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. The California court may also make this determination.

For discussion, see §200.24.

4. [§200.5] Venue Checklist

Venue is governed by CCP §395(a) in the following instances:

- For custody in a dissolution action: the county where either petitioner or respondent has resided for the previous three months.
- In an action for legal separation or nullity: the county in which either petitioner or respondent resides at the commencement of the action.
- For modifications of existing orders (CCP §397.5):
 - Venue remains in the county or original jurisdiction as long as one of the parties resides there; or
 - If both parties have moved from the county that issued the original decree, the court in that county has the discretion to change the venue for any modification proceeding to the county where either party resides. CCP §397.5.

For discussion, see §200.27.

B. [§200.6] Hearing on Order To Show Cause: Custody and Visitation

(1) *Commissioners or attorneys serving as temporary judges should obtain a stipulation from the parties. Cal Rules of Ct 244.*

(2) *Determine whether minor children are in the courtroom.* If so, address the issue under your court's policies.

- ☛ **JUDICIAL TIP:** Most courts do not allow minor children, even older ones, into the family law courtroom. This is particularly true if their parents' case is set for hearing. It may not be in the child's best interest to hear the evidence the parents are presenting, nor even to hear the evidence and accusations made by other parents in other cases. Furthermore, if the parties brought the children with the intent that the court will hear testimony from them, the court has an obligation to control the questioning of the minor witness and has many ways to obtain information from the minor. For discussion, see §§200.50–200.51.

(3) *Determine whether a domestic violence protective order has been issued in any of the cases or whether either party has alleged domestic violence in writing, under penalty of perjury.* Note that special procedures may be required in such cases. For discussion, see §200.54.

(4) *Warn any party who is the subject of the protective order or against whom domestic violence has been alleged that any statements made in this proceeding may be used as evidence against the party in any criminal proceedings arising from the allegations or incidents involved*

and that the party has a right to remain silent, refuse to testify or respond, and not incriminate him- or herself.

(5) If hearing an ex parte request for custody or visitation, determine whether:

- The child is faced with immediate harm that includes:
 - A recent act of domestic violence directed to child or to other party or in presence of child;
 - A pattern of domestic violence in the past; or
 - Lack of supervision for the child.

OR

- There is an immediate risk that the child will be removed from the state.

(6) If any of the factors in item 5 are present:

- Issue an ex parte temporary custody order.
- Set a hearing date within 20 days.
- Issue an order to show cause on the respondent.
- Enter an order restraining the party receiving custody from removing the child from the state pending notice and the hearing on the order.

For discussion of ex parte orders, see §200.29.

(7) If none of the factors in item 5 is present, the court may not issue orders ex parte but must set the matter for hearing and require proper service and notice. The court, however, may shorten the time for the hearing and service of notice of the hearing

(8) Call the calendar to determine if the parties and counsel are present and to get time estimates for each hearing.

(9) If only one party is present, determine whether the other party has been served, or whether, if served, service was timely.

(10) If absent party was not served or service was untimely:

- Reissue the order to show cause with a new hearing date.
- Set a new date for mediation before new hearing date.
- Instruct petitioner to serve all original documents as well as the notice of the new date or dates.

(11) If the absent party was served in a timely manner, the hearing will proceed as a default.

(12) *If it is the practice to do so, administer an oath to all witnesses at this time.* Otherwise, administer the oath to the parties and their witnesses as each case is called forward.

(13) *Determine if the parties have been to mediation.*

(14) *If the parties have not been to mediation:*

- Assign a new date for mediation and a continued hearing date subsequent to the mediation date. Instruct both parties to appear at mediation and at the new hearing date. The court may not make custody or visitation orders without an attempt at mediation.
- If one party has had exclusive control and care of the child and the other party has not had contact with the child, the court should determine whether the parties can agree to some contact or visitation or whether it should order some minimal contact until the parties can go to mediation.

(15) *If the parties have been to mediation:*

- Determine whether the parties have received copies of the mediation report from the mediator. If one or more of the parties have not received the report, ask court staff to make copies of the report for them to review immediately. Pass the case and move it to the bottom of the calendar. Often that provides sufficient time for the parties to be able to review and take action on the report without having to continue the matter. [Fam C §3186\(a\)](#); [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(e\)\(8\)\(A\)](#).
- Determine whether the parties reached an agreement at mediation.
 - If an agreement has been reached, call the parties and ask them if they have read and if they understand the mediator's report of their agreement and if the report accurately reflects their agreement. Verify that they assent to the agreement and, absent any concerns the court may have based on review of the declarations, the mediation report, or statements made by the parties, confirm the agreement and incorporate it in the order for custody and visitation rights. See [§200.89](#).
 - If the parties did not reach an agreement or reached only a partial agreement, subsequent actions will be determined by the type of mediation program used in the court's county.
 - If nonrecommending (confidential) mediation program: After being informed in writing by mediator that agreement was not reached on specified issues, consider resubmitting the matter to mediation, ordering a custody evaluation, or setting date for hearing. See [§§200.77, 200.90](#).

- If recommending (nonconfidential) mediation program: Review mediator's report and any recommendations from the mediator as to custody and visitation. The parties are entitled to a hearing to examine the mediator about his or her recommendations. Consider and review all other evidence, including testimony from the parties, declarations, parties' comments, and response to the mediator's recommendations. Consider resubmitting the matter to mediation, or ordering a custody evaluation. See §§200.76, 200.90.

➡ **JUDICIAL TIP:** Mediation procedures vary greatly from county to county. Before beginning any family law assignment, the judge should meet with the local Family Court Services staff and become thoroughly familiar with the local court rules regarding confidentiality of mediation.

(16) *Consider the applicable standards for custody and visitation.* The broad general standard is the best interest of the child. Fam C §3011. In determining this standard, the court must use the health, safety, and welfare of the child as a primary consideration, as well as any history of parental abuse, the nature and amount of contact with both parents, and the habitual or continual use of controlled substances or alcohol. Fam C §3011(a)–(d). See §§200.34–200.46.

(17) *Consider the ramifications of the types of custody in making a custody determination*—legal custody, which may be granted solely or jointly, or physical custody, which may be granted solely or jointly (see §§200.30–200.33).

(18) *If joint custody is awarded:*

- *Legal Custody.* Specify the circumstances under which the consent of both parents is required in order to exercise legal control and the consequences of a failure to obtain mutual consent before acting. Fam C §3083.
- *Physical Custody.* Specify the rights of each parent to physical control of the child in sufficient detail to enable a parent deprived of that control to implement laws for relief of child snatching and kidnapping. Fam C §3084.
- On a party's request, state the reasons for awarding joint custody. Fam C §3082.
- If appropriate, specify one parent as the primary caretaker of the child or children and one home as the primary home of the child or children, for purposes of determining eligibility for public assistance. Fam C §3086.

(19) *If sole physical custody is awarded:*

- Specify visitation schedule of noncustodial parent.

- If appropriate, specify conditions of supervised visitation.
- On a party's request, state the reasons for denying award of joint custody. [Fam C §3082](#).

(20) *Ensure that the custody or visitation order includes the following ([Fam C §3048](#)):*

- The basis for the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
- The manner in which notice and opportunity to be heard were given.
- A clear description of the custody and visitation rights of each party.
- A provision stating that a violation of the order may subject the party in violation to civil or criminal penalties, or both.
- Identification of the child's or children's country of habitual residence.

(21) *If appropriate, refer parties to conciliation court for assistance in formulating a plan for implementation of the custody order or resolving disputes arising from implementation of the order ([Fam C §3089](#)), or require the parties to submit a plan for implementation of the order ([Fam C §3040\(a\)\(1\)](#)).*

C. Move-Away Checklists

1. [\[§200.7\]](#) Initial Custody Determinations

When the parent with primary custody of the child intends to move with the child, the court must consider the following when making a custody determination:

(1) All relevant circumstances bearing on the best interest of the child, e.g., health, safety, and welfare of child, and history of abuse (best interest standard).

(2) The effects of the move as it bears on the nature of the child's contact with both parents, the child's age, community ties, and health and education needs. Also take into account the child's preferences.

(3) Whether the move is in good faith and not intended to frustrate the other parent's contact with the child. The nonmoving party must establish that the move is in bad faith. Otherwise, the trial court is not required to question the motivation for the move.

(4) The nature and length of the custodial relationship as it existed just before the move. When the moving parent has maintained custody for a significant period, the nonmoving parent will bear the burden of persuading the court that a change in custody is in the child's best interest.

For a comprehensive discussion, see [§§200.118–200.125](#).

2. [§200.8] Modification of Existing Judicially Determined Custody Order

(1) *When existing order grants one parent sole physical custody:*

- The noncustodial parent must show that the move
 - Is made in bad faith; or
 - Would cause detriment to the child, requiring a reevaluation of the child's custody. If this showing is made, the court must determine whether a change in custody is in the best interest of the child.

OR

- The parents have a de facto shared physical custody, in which case the court must conduct a de novo determination of custody based on the child's best interest.

(2) *When existing order grants joint or shared physical custody:*

- The court must conduct a de novo determination of custody based on the child's best interest.

OR

- One parent must show that the other parent has not shared in his or her parenting responsibilities, thereby establishing de facto sole physical custody. In that case, the actual custodial parent is entitled to a presumption of the ability to change the residence unless the other parent shows that:
 - The move is in bad faith; or
 - The move would cause detriment to the child, requiring a reevaluation of the child's custody. If this showing is made, the court must determine whether a change in custody is in the best interest of the child.

For a comprehensive discussion, see §§200.118–200.122, 200.126–200.130.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Jurisdiction

1. [§200.9] Family Court Proceedings

Family Code §3022 provides that the superior court may, during the pendency of a proceeding, or at any time thereafter, make such orders for the custody of a child during minority as may be necessary or proper. Family Code custody and visitation proceedings are governed by Fam C §§3000 *et seq.*, and these statutes apply to the following (Fam C §3021):

- Proceedings for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, and legal separation of the parties.
- An action for exclusive custody under [Fam C §3120](#).
- A proceeding to determine physical or legal custody or visitation in a proceeding under the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act \(Fam C §§6200 et seq\)](#).
- A proceeding to determine physical or legal custody or visitation in an action under the [Uniform Parentage Act \(Fam C §§7600 et seq\)](#).
- A proceeding to determine physical or legal custody or visitation in an action brought by the local child support agency under [Fam C §17404](#).

2. Preemption of Family Court Custody Jurisdiction

a. [§200.10] Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

When a minor has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court under [Welf & I C §§300 et seq](#), that court acquires sole and exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the custody of the child and visitation with the child. [Welf & I C §§302\(c\), 304](#); [Cal Rules of Ct 1429.1\(a\)](#). Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court is a final judgment and remains in effect after the court's jurisdiction is terminated. It may not be modified in a family court proceeding or action unless the court finds that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the issuance of the order, and modification of the order is in the best interest of the child. [Welf & I C §302\(d\)](#).

The juvenile court has preemptive jurisdiction to adjudicate dependency notwithstanding a family court's preexisting custody order in a marital action, regardless of the degree to which the same issues will be heard in a dependency action. *In re Desiree B.* (1992) 8 CA4th 286, 291–293, 10 CR2d 254 (juvenile court not collaterally estopped from reconsidering custody issues already decided in family court); *In re Travis C.* (1991) 233 CA3d 492, 499–503, 284 CR 469 (juvenile court had jurisdiction over petition containing same factual allegations despite fact that hearing on those allegations was pending in family law court; juvenile court's power to protect children even if family law court has prior jurisdiction is single exception to the rule that among courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that which takes jurisdiction first in time has exclusive jurisdiction).

b. [§200.11] Tribal Jurisdiction Under Indian Child Welfare Act

Indian tribes that are recognized by the Department of the Interior have exclusive jurisdiction over certain child custody proceedings (foster

care placement, termination of parental rights, adoption proceedings) involving Indian children residing or domiciled within their reservation under the [Indian Child Welfare Act \(ICWA\)](#) (25 USC §§1901 et seq). 25 USC §1911(a). In custody proceedings involving Indian children who are not domiciled or residing within the reservation, the tribes have limited jurisdiction. In these cases, the tribes have the right to notice and to intervene in state court proceedings. 25 USC §§1911(b)–(c), 1912(a).

The ICWA specifically excludes custody awards to a parent in “divorce proceedings.” 25 USC §1903. Therefore, the impact of the ICWA is limited in custody proceedings unless custody is to be awarded to a nonparent.

The California legislature has adopted the federal declaration of policy of the ICWA to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from their families. See [Fam C §7810](#); [Welf & I C §360.6](#). In California, the ICWA must be applied in any proceeding in which there is a determination by an Indian tribe that an unmarried person, who is under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. [Fam C §7810\(c\)](#); [Welf & I C §360.6\(c\)](#).

3. [§200.12] Interstate Disputes

The [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act \(UCCJEA\)](#) ([Fam C §§3400 et seq](#)) determines the proper subject matter jurisdiction as being between interested states for virtually any custody or visitation dispute. [Fam C §3402\(c\)–\(d\)](#). UCCJEA requirements must be met whenever a California court is called on to make an initial or modified custody or visitation determination. Unless California is an appropriate court under UCCJEA guidelines, there is no jurisdiction to make any custody orders other than emergency orders. [Fam C §§3421–3424](#).

The [Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act \(PKPA\)](#); 28 USC §1738A) should also be consulted for jurisdictional requirements in appropriate cases. The PKPA was enacted to provide nationwide enforcement of custody orders made in accordance with the UCCJEA. *Marriage of Zierenberg* (1992) 11 CA4th 1436, 1441–1442, 16 CR2d 238. The PKPA contains provisions that are similar to those of the UCCJEA, but they are not identical in every aspect. The provisions of the PKPA are controlling in cases where its provisions conflict with those of the UCCJEA. *Marriage of Zierenberg, supra*.

A custody proceeding pertaining to an Indian child is not subject to the UCCJEA to the extent it is governed by the [Indian Child Welfare Act](#). See [§200.11](#).

4. Initial Custody Determinations

a. [§200.13] Grounds for Jurisdiction

The UCCJEA provides exclusive grounds for a California court's jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. [Fam C §3421\(a\), \(b\)](#). A child custody determination is defined as a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to the child. Child custody determinations include permanent, temporary, initial, and modification orders. [Fam C §3402\(c\)](#).

Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination. [Fam C §3421\(c\)](#).

Except as otherwise provided in the UCCJEA provisions for emergency jurisdiction under [Fam C §3424](#), there are four individual grounds for jurisdiction for making initial child custody determinations. See [§§200.14–200.17](#). The corresponding grounds on which a California court may assume jurisdiction under the PKPA are found in [28 USC §1728A\(c\)\(2\)\(A\)–\(D\)](#).

b. [§200.14] California Is Child's Home State

Jurisdiction is established in California under the UCCJEA if California was the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, *or* was the child's home state within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from California but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in California. [Fam C §3421\(a\)\(1\)](#).

Home state. A child's home state is the state in which the child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of the custody proceeding. If the child is less than six months of age, the home state is the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons counts as part of the time period. [Fam C §3402\(g\)](#).

Person acting as a parent. A person acting as a parent means a person, other than a parent, who (1) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement of the custody proceeding; and (2) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under California law. [Fam C §3402\(m\)](#).

c. [§200.15] No Other Home State; California More Appropriate Forum

Under the UCCJEA, California may exercise jurisdiction if no other state is the child's home state as specified in [Fam C §3421\(a\)\(1\)](#), *or* a court of the child's home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that California is the more appropriate forum under [Fam C §3427](#) *or* [§3428](#), and both of the following are true ([Fam C §3421\(a\)\(2\)](#)):

(A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with California other than mere physical presence.

(B) Substantial evidence is available in California concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

d. [§200.16] Other Courts Having Jurisdiction Deferred to California

Jurisdiction is established in California under the UCCJEA if all courts having jurisdiction under [Fam C §3421\(a\)\(1\)](#) *or* [\(a\)\(2\)](#) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a California court is the more appropriate forum to determine the child's custody under [Fam C §3427](#) *or* [§3428](#). [Fam C §3421\(a\)\(3\)](#).

e. [§200.17] Jurisdiction in No Other Court

Under the UCCJEA, California may exercise jurisdiction if no court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in [Fam C §3402\(a\)\(1\)](#), [\(a\)\(2\)](#), *or* [\(a\)\(3\)](#). [Fam C §3402\(a\)\(4\)](#).

If another state has made a child custody determination, a California court may not modify it unless (1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under [Fam C §3422](#) *or* that a California court would be a more convenient forum under [Fam C §3427](#); *or* (2) a California court *or* a court of the other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. [Fam C §3423](#).

5. [§200.18] Declining Exercise of Jurisdiction

There are three situations in which a California court that has jurisdiction under [Fam C §3421](#) may choose *or* be required to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. See [§§200.19–200.21](#).

a. [§200.19] Simultaneous Proceedings in Another State

Except as otherwise provided in [Fam C §3424](#) (emergency jurisdiction), a California court may not exercise its jurisdiction under

[Fam C §§3421–3430](#) if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a California court is a more convenient forum under [Fam C §3427](#). [Fam C §3426\(a\)](#).

Except as otherwise provided in [Fam C §3424](#), a California court, before hearing a child custody proceeding, must examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties under [Fam C §3429](#). [Fam C §3436\(b\)](#). If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance the UCCJEA, it must stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction does not determine that the California court is a more appropriate forum, the California court must dismiss the proceeding. [Fam C §3426\(b\)](#).

For a discussion of modification jurisdiction when an out-of-state court has commenced a proceeding to enforce a child custody order, see [§200.25](#).

b. [§200.20](#) Inconvenient Forum

A California court that has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court's own motion, or request of another court. [Fam C §3427\(a\)](#).

Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, the court must consider whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court must allow the parties to submit information and must consider all relevant factors, including ([Fam C §3427\(b\)](#)):

- Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child.
- The length of time the child has resided outside California.
- The distance between the California court and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction.
- The degree of financial hardship to the parties in litigating in one forum over the other.

- Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction.
- The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child.
- The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence.
- The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.

If the California court determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it

- Must stay the proceedings on condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper ([Fam C §3427\(c\)](#)); and
- May require the party who commenced the proceeding to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceeding in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the other parties or their witnesses ([Fam C §3427\(e\)](#)).

A court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction of a child custody determination if it is incidental to an action for dissolution of marriage or other proceeding and still retain jurisdiction over the dissolution or other proceeding. [Fam C §3427\(d\)](#).

c. [§200.21] Unjustifiable Conduct of Petitioner

Except as otherwise provided in [Fam C §3424](#) (emergency jurisdiction) or by any other law of this state, if a California court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court must decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless one of the following is true ([Fam C §3428\(a\)](#)):

- The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction.
- A California court otherwise having jurisdiction under [Fam C §§3421–3423](#), determines that California is a more appropriate forum under [Fam C §3427](#).
- No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in [Fam C §§3421–3423](#).

[Family Code §3128](#) is directed at a petitioning parent's wrongful taking of a child to another state in an attempt to create jurisdiction in a

chosen forum. California courts, interpreting the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act “wrongful conduct” provision (former Fam C §3408), have generally limited application of the provision to situations in which a child has been removed from the state in violation of an existing custody order or injunction. See *Haywood v Superior Court* (2000) 77 CA4th 949, 956–957, 92 CR2d 182.

If a California court declines to exercise its jurisdiction under Fam C §3428(a), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a recurrence of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction under Fam C §§3421–3423. Fam C §3428(b).

If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction under Fam C §3428(a), it must assess necessary and reasonable expenses against the party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction. These include costs for communication expenses, attorneys’ fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate. Fam C §3438(c).

In making a determination under Fam C §3428, a court may not consider as a factor weighing against the petitioner any taking or retention of the child after a visit, or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody, from the person who has legal custody, if there is evidence that the taking or retention of the child was a result of domestic violence against the petitioner, as defined in Fam C §6211. Fam C §3428(d).

6. [§200.22] Emergency Jurisdiction

Even when UCCJEA jurisdiction rests with another state, a California court may exercise temporary custody jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and either (1) the child has been “abandoned,” that is, left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision; or (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction is “necessary in an emergency” to protect the child because the child, the child’s sibling, or the child’s parent is subjected to, or threatened with, “mistreatment or abuse.” Fam C §§3424(a), 3402(a).

Unless there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to enforcement under the UCCJEA, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a state with proper UCCJEA jurisdiction, an emergency child custody order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the court having jurisdiction. Such an order will become a final determination if the order so provides and if California becomes the home state of the child. Fam C §3424(b).

If there is a previous child custody determination entitled to UCCJEA enforcement or an action properly commenced, any emergency order must

specify a period of time that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain it from the proper state. [Fam C §3424\(c\)](#). If a court learns of a valid prior order or commencement of an action in another state, the California court must immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order. [Fam C §3424\(d\)](#).

7. Modification Jurisdiction

a. [§200.23] Modification of Prior California Order

Except as otherwise provided in [Fam C §3424](#) (emergency jurisdiction), a California court that has made a child custody determination consistent with [Fam C §3421](#) or [§3423](#) has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination unless either of the following occurs ([Fam C §3422\(a\)](#)):

- A California court determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with California, and that substantial evidence is no longer available in California concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
- A California court or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in California.

A California court that has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under [Fam C §3422](#) may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under [Fam C §3421](#).

b. [§200.24] Modification of Order of Another State

Except as otherwise provided in [Fam C §3424](#), a California court may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless the California court has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under [Fam C §3421\(a\)\(1\)](#) or [\(a\)\(2\)](#) ("home state" or "significant connection" jurisdiction), and either of the following determinations is made:

- The court of the other state determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under [Fam C §3422](#), or that a California court would be a more convenient forum under [Fam C §3427](#).

- A California court or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.
- **JUDICIAL TIP:** Before exercising jurisdiction over an order of another state, the court should communicate with the out-of-state court on the question of that state’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. See [Fam C §3426\(b\)](#) (duty to communicate in case of simultaneous proceedings).

c. [§200.25] Proceeding To Enforce Order in Another State

In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a California court must determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. [Fam C §3426\(c\)](#). If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may do any of the following ([Fam C §3426\(c\)](#)):

- Stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement.
- Enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement.
- Proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.

d. [§200.26] Declining Exercise of Jurisdiction To Modify Order

A California court that has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. [Fam C §3427](#) (applicable to both initial custody orders and modification of custody orders). See detailed discussion of [Fam C §3427](#) in [§200.20](#).

8. [§200.27] Venue

The court’s jurisdiction to determine custody is governed by the general venue statute. [CCP §395\(a\)](#). Thus, for example, in an action for dissolution, a petitioner may begin a proceeding in the county where either petitioner or respondent has resided for the previous three months. In an action for legal separation or nullity, the county in which either resides at the commencement of the action remains the proper venue throughout the proceeding. [CCP §395\(a\)](#).

Venue for modifications remains in the county or original jurisdiction as long as one of the parties resides there. If both parties have moved from the county that issued the original decree, the court in that county has the discretion to change the venue for any modification proceeding to the county where either party resides. [CCP §397.5](#).

B. Initial Custody Orders

1. [§200.28] Temporary or Pendente Lite Order

Most often the first custody order the court is asked to make is a temporary or pendente lite order made upon an order to show cause. A petition for a temporary custody order may be included with the initial petition or action or at any time after the initial filing. [Fam C §3060](#). If parties agree or reach an understanding about custody or temporary custody, they may attach a copy of the agreement or an affidavit setting forth their understanding to the petition, and the court is bound, except in “exceptional circumstances,” to enter an order granting temporary custody in accordance with the agreement, understanding, or stipulation of the parties. [Fam C §3061](#).

Often the parties are satisfied with the pendente lite orders and stipulate or ask that those orders be incorporated into the dissolution judgment. Thus, the orders made at the initial order to show cause hearing may be the only time the court is called upon to make any custody or visitation determinations.

However, the parties may return to court before entry of a judgment setting forth custody and visitation rights to seek changes in the initial temporary orders. The court may modify the pendente lite orders any time before entry of judgment.

🔑 **JUDICIAL TIP:** Parties and their attorneys often believe that the first or initial custody determination is critically important because many judges frequently maintain the status quo through subsequent custody proceedings. Although the initial ruling is important, the court may diffuse the situation by recognizing that an immediate decision must be made but that orders may be modified when warranted by the facts.

2. [§200.29] Ex Parte Order

A party seeking an initial or modified custody order may request an ex parte temporary custody order before the hearing date set for the order to show cause if there is no agreement, understanding, or stipulation. An ex parte custody order may be granted if there is a showing of “immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the child will be removed from the State of California.” [Fam C §3064](#). These are the only circumstances

under which a court may issue ex parte custody or change of custody orders.

“Immediate harm to the child” includes:

- Having a parent who has committed recent acts of domestic violence or when such acts are a part of a demonstrated and continuing pattern. [Fam C §3064](#).
- Failing to provide supervision for a young child. *Marriage of Slayton* (2001) 86 CA4th 653, 656–657, 103 CR2d 545 (also relying on definitions of neglect and matters subject to mandatory reporting laws in analyzing what constitutes “immediate harm”; see [Pen C §§11165.2 and 11166](#)).

If the court issues an ex parte order, it must also issue an order to show cause and set a hearing date within 20 days. That date may be extended pending entry of final judgment if the responding party is served and does not appear or respond within the time set. [Fam C §3062\(a\)](#). Ex parte orders may be extended up to an additional 90 days and a hearing date reset if the responding party is not served, despite good faith efforts, and the party who received ex parte orders shows by affidavit or other proof under penalty of perjury that the responding party has possession of the minor child and seeks to avoid the jurisdiction of the court or is concealing the child. [Fam C §3062\(b\)](#).

In conjunction with an ex parte order, the court must enter an order restraining the person receiving custody from removing the child from the state pending notice and a hearing on the order. [Fam C §3063](#).

- ➡ **JUDICIAL TIP:** A determination of whether to issue an ex parte custody order involves some of the most difficult decisions the court will make. In most cases, the court will not have sufficient information to make confident custody decisions. But if the court does not grant appropriate interim relief, there can be tremendous harm to a spouse or children from domestic violence.

C. Types of Custody Orders

1. Overview and Definitions

a. [§200.30] Legal and Physical Custody

In California, custody is of two types: legal and physical. See [Fam C §§3002–3007](#). “Legal” custody refers to the right and responsibility to make decisions related to the health, education, and welfare of the child. [Fam C §§3003, 3006](#). “Physical” custody refers to the time periods during which a child resides with and is under the supervision of a parent or other party. [Fam C §§3004, 3007](#).

Either or both types of custody may be granted solely to one parent or jointly to both parents. [Fam C §§3003–3007](#).

The type of custody (legal or physical) and the means of holding it (jointly or solely) can have an impact on future decisions the court is called upon to make, such as whether a parent is allowed to relocate or change the residence of the minor child, and where the child attends school.

b. [§200.31] Sole Custody

Sole legal custody means that one parent has the right and responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of the child. [Fam C §3006](#).

Sole physical custody means that the child resides with and is under the supervision of one parent, subject to visitation with the other parent as ordered by the court. [Fam C §3007](#).

Even if one party has sole legal or physical custody, the noncustodial parent cannot be denied access to records and information regarding the child, including medical, dental, and school records, because the parent is not the custodial parent. [Fam C §3025](#).

c. [§200.32] Joint Custody

Joint legal custody means both parents share the right and responsibility to make decisions related to the health, education, and welfare of the minor child. [Fam C §3003](#).

Joint physical custody means that each parent has significant periods of physical custody, and it must be shared in a way that assures the child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. [Fam C §3004](#).

2. [§200.33] Presumption and Special Rules Applicable to Joint Custody Orders

Presumption. There is a presumption affecting the burden of proof that joint custody is in the best interest of the minor child when the parents have agreed to joint custody or when they agree in open court at a hearing on custody. [Fam C §3080](#). The court, however, in applying this presumption, must still give consideration to the factors that determine the best interest of the child as described in [Fam C §3011](#).

If the parents do not agree to a joint custody order, the court may make such an order upon the request of either parent. [Fam C §3081](#). Again, the court must consider and apply the factors that determine the best interest of the child as described in [Fam C §3011](#).

Special rules. When the court grants or denies a parent's request for joint custody in the absence of an agreement between both parents, it must, if requested by one of the parties, state the reasons for granting or

denying the request. A broad statement that the joint custody order is or is not in the best interest of the child is insufficient as a statement of the reasons for the court's action. [Fam C §3082](#).

When it makes a joint legal custody order, the court must specify the circumstances under which the consent of both parents is required in order to exercise legal control of the minor and the consequences of the failure to obtain mutual consent before acting. In all other circumstances, either parent acting alone may exercise legal control. A joint legal custody order also is not to be construed to permit an action that is inconsistent with the physical custody order unless the court expressly authorizes the action. [Fam C §3083](#).

Joint legal custody may be awarded without awarding joint physical custody. [Fam C §3085](#). In such cases, the parents, unless otherwise specified by the court under [Fam C §3083](#), each have rights to make decisions regarding child care, religion, extracurricular activities, school enrollment, and the like.

An award of joint physical custody does not necessarily mean that the parties have an equal or approximately equal share of time. However, it does mean that both parties have significant periods of physical custody. The court must specify the times of physical control for each party and the rights of each party during such times in sufficient detail to enable a parent deprived of such control to implement laws for relief of child snatching and kidnapping. [Fam C §3084](#).

The court may specify one parent as primary caretaker and one home as primary home for the purposes of determining eligibility for public assistance even when making an order for joint legal and joint physical custody. [Fam C §3086](#).

Although [Fam C §§3080 and 3081](#) appear to preclude the court from ordering joint custody on its own motion in the absence of an agreement by the parties or request of one party, the court may modify or terminate a joint custody order on its own motion. [Fam C §3087](#).

In counties that have a conciliation court, the court may refer the parties to the conciliation court for assistance in formulating a plan to implement a joint custody order or resolving disputes arising during the implementation of a joint custody order. [Fam C §3089](#). In addition, the court may require the parties to submit a plan for implementation of the custody order. [Fam C §3040\(a\)\(1\)](#).

D. Guidelines for Custody Determinations

1. [§200.34] Best Interest of Child

The broad legal standard that governs a court's decisions in matters of custody and visitation is the best interest of the child. [Fam C §3011](#). The standard is “an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition.” Its

purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult. *Adoption of Matthew B.* (1991) 232 CA3d 1239, 1263, 284 CR 18. The “best interest” standard is a relative one. The question is not whether a particular set of circumstances is in the best interest of the child, but whether a particular set of circumstances in relation to an alternative set of circumstances is in the best interest of the child. 232 CA3d at 1264.

The court must consider the following factors in determining the child's best interest (Fam C §3011(a)–(d)):

- The child's health, safety, and welfare. See §200.35.
- The nature and amount of the child's contact with both parents. See §200.36.
- History of drug or alcohol abuse. See §§200.37–200.39.
- History of physical abuse. See §§200.40–200.46.
- Any other factors the court deems relevant.

The court must weigh these factors and determine a child's best interest solely from the child's standpoint. The court should not consider the feelings and desires of the contesting parents except as they affect the child's best interest. 232 CA3d at 1264.

✎ JUDICIAL TIP: In contentious custody disputes, some judges remind the parties that the hearing is not a contest between them, but an effort to arrive at a coparenting agreement that is in the child's best interest. The process itself can create conflict and result in parties emphasizing negatives, which the court should discourage.

a. [§200.35] Child's Health, Safety, and Welfare

The court must take into account the child's health, safety, and welfare when making a determination of the best interest of the child. Fam C §3011(a). In addition, the Legislature has declared that it is the state's public policy that the health, safety, and welfare of the child must be the court's primary concern in determining the best interest of the child when making custody or visitation orders. Fam C §3020(a). Consistent with this policy is the legislative finding that child abuse or domestic violence in a household where a child resides is detrimental to the child. Fam C §3020(a).

b. [§200.36] Contact With Parents

In determining the child's best interest, the court must take into account the nature and amount of contact with both parents, except as provided in Fam C §3046 (absence or relocation from residence; see

§200.46). Fam C §3011(c). This is an adjunct to the “frequent and continuing contact” policy under Fam C §3020(b). See §200.47.

c. [§200.37] History of Drug or Alcohol Abuse

In determining the child’s best interest, the court must also consider either parent’s habitual illegal use of controlled substances or continual abuse of alcohol. Fam C §3011(d). Before considering allegations of a parent’s drug or alcohol abuse, the court may require independent corroboration. Fam C §3011(d).

If the court makes an order for sole or joint custody to a parent against whom allegations of drug or alcohol abuse have been made, the court must state its reasons in writing or on the record (Fam C §3011(e)(1)) unless the custody award is made under the parties’ written or on-the-record stipulation (Fam C §3011(e)(2)). Any order made in these circumstances must be specific as to time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child as provided in Fam C §6323(c).

(1) [§200.38] Corroborative Evidence of Drug or Alcohol Abuse

Before considering allegations of drug or alcohol abuse, the court may require substantial independent corroboration, including, but not limited to, written reports by (Fam C §3011(d)):

- Law enforcement agencies.
- Courts.
- Probation departments.
- Social welfare agencies.
- Medical facilities.
- Rehabilitation facilities.
- Other public agencies or nonprofit organizations providing drug and alcohol abuse services.

(2) [§200.39] Drug Testing

If a court determines, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that there is the habitual, frequent, or continual use of controlled substances or the habitual or continual abuse of alcohol by a parent or legal custodian, it may order that parent or legal custodian to undergo testing for illegal use of controlled substances and alcohol use. Fam C §3041.5(a). The evidence may include, but may not be limited to, a conviction within the last five years for the illegal use or possession of controlled substances. Fam C §3041.5(a)

The court must order the least intrusive method of testing for the use of controlled substances or alcohol. If a parent or legal custodian tests positive for controlled substance or alcohol use, he or she may request a hearing to challenge the test result. [Fam C §3041.5\(a\)](#). A positive test result may not, by itself, constitute grounds for an adverse custody decision. Rather, it must be weighed with all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child. [Fam C §3041.5\(a\)](#).

Test results are confidential and must be maintained as a sealed record. The results may be released only to the court, the parties and their counsel, the Judicial Council (for study purposes), and any person to whom the court grants access by written authorization with prior notice to the parties. [Fam C §3041.5\(a\)](#).

The test results are to be used exclusively to help the court determine the best interest of the child under [Fam C §3011](#) and the content of a custody or visitation order, and may not be used for any other purpose in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding. [Fam C §3041.5\(a\)](#).

- JUDICIAL TIP: Allegations of drug or alcohol abuse are easily made and difficult to disprove. Drug testing of one party (or of both parties if the charges are mutual) is a quick and convenient way to obtain some independent (and/or mutual) verification of a party's probable abuse of drugs or alcohol. Frequently, the accused party or parties will be willing to take a drug test voluntarily in order to eliminate that issue from consideration by the court and to allay the fears of the charging party.

d. [§200.40] History of Physical Abuse

The court must consider any history of abuse by one parent or any other person seeking custody against

- Any child to whom he or she is related by blood or affinity or with whom he or she has had a caretaking relationship, no matter how temporary ([Fam C §3011\(b\)\(1\)](#));
- The other parent ([Fam C §3011\(b\)\(2\)](#)); or
- A parent, current spouse or cohabitant, or person with whom he or she has a dating or engagement relationship ([Fam C §3011\(b\)\(3\)](#)).

If the court makes an order for sole or joint custody to a parent against whom allegations of abuse have been made, the court must state its reasons in writing or on the record ([Fam C §3011\(e\)\(1\)](#)) unless the custody award is made under the parties' written or on-the-record stipulation ([Fam C §3011\(e\)\(2\)](#)). Any order made in these circumstances must be specific as to time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child as provided in [Fam C §6323\(c\)](#).

(1) [§200.41] Definition of Abuse

Abuse against a child described in [Fam C §3011\(b\)\(1\)](#) is defined as nonaccidental infliction of physical injury, sexual abuse, neglect, willful cruelty, or unlawful corporal punishment. See [Pen C §11165.6](#). Abuse against any other person described in [Fam C §3011\(b\)\(2\)](#) or [\(b\)\(3\)](#) is defined as intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, sexual assault, placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another, or engaging in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined under [Fam C §6320](#). See [Fam C §6203](#).

(2) [§200.42] Corroborative Evidence of Physical Abuse

Before considering allegations of abuse, the court may require substantial independent corroboration, including, but not limited to, written reports by ([Fam C §3011\(b\)\(3\)](#)):

- Law enforcement agencies.
- Child protective services or other social welfare agencies.
- Courts.
- Medical facilities.
- Other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations providing services to victims of sexual assault or domestic violence.

(3) [§200.43] Family Code §3044 Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Domestic Violence Perpetrator

If the court finds that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated an act of domestic violence against the other party seeking custody, or against the child or the child’s siblings within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that granting sole or joint legal or physical custody to the perpetrator is detrimental to the best interest of the child under [Fam C §3011](#). [Fam C §3044\(a\)](#). Note that this presumption is distinct from the mandatory consideration of physical abuse as a factor in determining a child’s best interest under [Fam C §3011\(b\)](#) (see [§§200.40–200.42](#)) and applies to a narrower category of cases than [Fam C §3011](#).

Under [Fam C §3044\(c\)](#), a person has “perpetrated domestic violence” when he or she is found by a court to have:

- Intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily injury or sexual assault; or
- Placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another; or

- Engaged in behavior that includes, but is not limited to, the following: threatening, harassing, striking, destroying personal property, or disturbing the peace of another for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect the other parent seeking custody, the child, or the child's siblings under [Fam C §6320](#).

When a party in a custody or restraining order proceeding alleges that the other party has perpetrated domestic violence under the terms of [Fam C §3044](#), the court must advise the parties of [Fam C §3044](#) and provide them a copy of the code before any custody mediation in the case. [Fam C §3044\(f\)](#).

(4) [§200.44] Finding Under Fam C §3044

The finding required under [Fam C §3044\(a\)](#) (perpetration of domestic violence within previous five years) is satisfied by, but not limited to ([Fam C §3044\(d\)](#)):

- Evidence that a party seeking custody has been convicted within the previous five years of any crime against the other party that comes within the definition of domestic violence contained in [Fam C §6211](#) and of abuse contained in [Fam C §6203](#), including, but not limited to, [Pen C §§243\(e\)](#) (domestic battery), [261](#) (rape), [262](#) (spousal rape), [273.5](#) (inflicting corporal injury), [422](#) (criminal threats), and [646.9](#) (stalking).
- A finding under [Fam C §3044\(a\)](#) by any court, whether or not that court hears or has heard the custody proceedings, based on conduct occurring within the previous five years.

The court may not base its finding that a party has perpetrated domestic violence solely on the conclusions reached by a child custody evaluator or on the recommendation of the Family Court Services staff. It must consider all relevant and admissible evidence submitted by the parties. [Fam C §3044\(e\)](#).

(5) [§200.45] Rebutting Fam C §3044 Presumption

The presumption in [Fam C §3044\(a\)](#) may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court must consider all the following factors in determining whether the presumption has been overcome ([Fam C §3044\(b\)](#)):

- Whether the perpetrator has demonstrated that giving sole or joint legal or physical custody to him or her is in the child's best interest. In determining the child's best interest, the preference for frequent and continuing contact with both parents, as set forth in [Fam C §3020\(b\)](#), or with the noncustodial parent, as set forth in

[Fam C §3040\(a\)\(1\)](#), may not be used to rebut the presumption in whole or in part.

- Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a batterer’s treatment program that meets the criteria in [Pen C §1203.097\(c\)](#).
- Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a drug or alcohol abuse counseling program if the court determines that such a program is appropriate.
- Whether the perpetrator has completed a parenting class if the court determines that such a class is appropriate.
- Whether the perpetrator is on probation or parole, and whether he or she has complied with the terms and conditions of probation or parole.
- Whether the perpetrator is restrained by a protective or restraining order, and whether he or she has complied with its terms and conditions.
- Whether the perpetrator has committed any further acts of domestic violence.

(6) [§200.46] Child Sexual Abuse Allegations

If allegations of child sexual abuse are made during a child custody proceeding and the court has concerns regarding the child’s safety, the court may take any reasonable, temporary steps as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate under the circumstances to protect the child’s safety until an investigation can be completed. [Fam C §3027\(a\)](#). The court may request the local child welfare services agency to conduct an investigation of the allegations and report its findings to the court. [Fam C §3027\(b\)](#).

No parent shall be placed on supervised visitation, be denied custody of or visitation with his or her child, or have his or her custody or visitation rights limited, solely because the parent (1) lawfully reported suspected sexual abuse of the child; (2) otherwise acted lawfully, based on a reasonable belief, to determine if his or her child was the victim of sexual abuse; or (3) sought treatment for the child from a licensed mental health professional for suspected sexual abuse. [Fam C §3027.5\(a\)](#). But the court may order supervised visitation or limit a parent’s custody or visitation if the court finds substantial evidence that the parent, with the intent to interfere with the other parent’s lawful contact with the child, knowingly made a false report of child sexual abuse during a child custody proceeding or at any other time. Any limitation of custody or visitation may be imposed only after the court has determined that the limitation is necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the child, and the

court has considered the state’s policy of ensuring that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents as stated in [Fam C §3020\(b\)](#).

Sanctions for false accusation. If the court determines, based on the investigation or other evidence, that a witness, party, or a party’s attorney knowingly made a false accusation of child abuse during a child custody proceeding, the court may impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed all costs incurred by the party accused as a direct result of defending the accusation, and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in recovering the sanctions, against the person making the accusation. [Fam C §3027.1\(a\)](#).

On motion by any person requesting sanctions, the court must issue its order to show cause why the requested sanctions should not be imposed. The order to show cause must be served on the person against whom the sanctions are sought at least 15 days before the hearing date. [Fam C §3027.1\(b\)](#).

Reconsideration of custody order. The court must grant a motion by a parent for reconsideration of an existing child custody order if the motion is based on the fact that the other parent was convicted of a crime in connection with falsely accusing the moving parent of child abuse. [Fam C §3022.5](#).

2. [§200.47] “Frequent and Continuing Contact” With Both Parents

In addition to the public policy that the health, safety, and welfare of a child must be the primary concern in determining the best interest of the child, the Legislature has also declared that it is a public policy to ensure that children have “frequent and continuing contact” with both parents after their separation or dissolution of marriage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy unless contact would not be in the best interest of the child. [Fam C §3020\(b\)](#).

If the two policies conflict, the court’s order must ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the child, and the safety of all family members. [Fam C §3020\(c\)](#).

When ordering sole custody, the court must consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent, consistent with [Fam C §§3011 and 3020](#). [Fam C §3040\(a\)\(1\)](#).

- **JUDICIAL TIP:** In contentious custody disputes, the court should remind the parties that one consideration in determining custody is which parent is most likely to encourage “frequent and continuing” contact with the other parent. This may encourage

each party to offer more custody time with the other parent and enhance the likelihood of a peaceful settlement.

3. [§200.48] Statutory Preferences

Family Code §3040 sets forth the following order of preference for awarding custody according to the best interest of the child as described in Fam C §§3011 and 3020:

(1) To both parents jointly or to either parent. Fam C §3040(a)(1). The court must consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. The court may not prefer a parent as custodian because of the parent's sex. Fam C §3040(a)(1).

(2) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in a “wholesome and stable environment.” Fam C §3040(a)(2).

(3) To any person or persons the court deems suitable and able to provide “adequate and proper” care and guidance for the child. Fam C §3040(a)(3).

Family Code §3040 does not establish a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but instead gives the court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child. Fam C §3040(b).

In granting custody under Fam C §3040(a)(2) and (3), the court must consider and give appropriate weight to a nomination of the guardian of the person of the child by a parent under Prob C §§1500 et seq. Fam C §3043. For a discussion of requirements and considerations for awarding custody to a nonparent, see §§200.59–200.60.

4. [§200.49] Child's Need for Bonding, Stability, and Continuity

Crucial to a best-interest determination is the importance of stability and continuity in the child's life, and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds. *Adoption of Matthew B.* (1991) 232 CA3d 1239, 1264, 284 CR 18. When making a custody determination, the court must make an assessment of the emotional bonds between a parent and child, and consider how to best provide continuity of attention, nurturing, and care of the child. The assessment requires an inquiry into the heart of the parent-child relationship, that is, the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance that the parent gives to the child throughout his or her formative years. *Adoption of Matthew B.*, *supra*. Therefore, the court must consider the length of time that the child has been in the continuous physical custody of

a parent who has custody at the time of the custody hearing. When a child has lived with one parent for a significant period, the need for continuity and stability will often dictate that the maintenance of the current arrangement is in the child's best interest. *Burchard v Garay* (1986) 42 C3d 531, 538, 229 CR 800.

- ➡ JUDICIAL TIP: A parent with a temporary or ex parte custody order may attempt to delay a full custody hearing for as long as possible in order to obtain a de facto custody determination based on continuity and stability. If a court suspects such conduct, it should consider ordering a comprehensive review as soon as possible.

5. Preference of Child

a. [§200.50] In General

The court must consider and give “due weight” to the wishes of the child in granting or modifying a custody order if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason in order to form an “intelligent preference” regarding custody. Fam C §3042(a). Age alone is not the determinative factor. Rather, the court should look to the child's degree of maturity, sincerity, and ability to reason. Thus, the preference of children as young as ten may be considered and given some weight if they appear mature and capable of reason (*Marriage of Rosson* (1986) 178 CA3d 1094, 1103, 224 CR 250, disapproved on other grounds in 13 C4th 25, 38), while older children's preferences may be disregarded if those preferences are not supported by well-thought-out reasons (*Marriage of Mehlmauer* (1976) 60 CA3d 104, 110–111, 131 CR 325). Most cases that have said the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hear evidence of the child's preference have involved children under the age of 14. *Coil v Coil* (1962) 211 CA2d 411, 27 CR 378 (12-year-old child); *Marriage of Slayton* (2001) 86 CA4th 653, 103 CR2d 545 (five-year-old child). On the other hand, the court is free to hear evidence of preference for children who are not yet teenagers. See *Marriage of Rosson, supra*. In either event, the court is not bound to follow the preferences of the child, no matter the age of the child. See *Marriage of Mehlmauer, supra*, and *Coil v Coil, supra*. The court may or may not consider the evidence, and once considered, it must only give it “due weight.” See Fam C §3042(a).

b. [§200.51] Obtaining Evidence of Child's Preference

Once the court decides to consider evidence of a child's preference, it has very broad discretion to determine how to obtain that evidence.

The court may preclude the calling of the child as a witness when it is in the child's best interest and may use alternative means to obtain

information of the child's preference. [Fam C §3042\(b\)](#). Alternative means can take many forms. The court may ask its child custody mediator to interview the child and report to the court. See, e.g., *Marriage of Slayton* (2001) 86 CA4th 653, 658, 103 CR2d 545 and *Marriage of Rosson* (1986) 178 CA3d 1094, 1103–1105, 224 CR 250, disapproved on other grounds in 13 C4th 25, 38. If there is no objection, the court can also allow the parents to testify to the child's preference. The court may appoint an attorney for the child or may order a child custody evaluation and obtain information regarding the child's preference from the attorney or evaluator. The court may also interview the child privately, on or off the record.

It is rare that a court would allow a child of any age to testify in a custody dispute between his or her parents. But if the court does decide to allow testimony, it must follow the requirements of [Evid C §765\(b\)](#) and control the child's examination so as to protect the child's best interest. [Fam C §3042\(b\)](#). Under [Evid C §765\(b\)](#), the court, when taking testimony from a witness under the age of 14, must take special care to protect the witness from repetitious questioning and from undue harassment or embarrassment. The court must also ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the age of the witness and may forbid questions not likely to be understood by a person of the witness's age.

6. [§200.52] Party's Absence or Relocation

The court must not consider a party's absence or relocation from the family residence as a factor in determining custody or visitation in either of the following circumstances when ([Fam C §3046\(a\)](#)):

- The absence or relocation is of short duration, and the court makes a finding that during the absence or relocation
 - the party has demonstrated an interest in maintaining custody or visitation,
 - the party maintains or makes reasonable efforts to maintain regular contact with the child, and
 - the party's behavior does not demonstrate an intent to abandon the child.
- The party is absent or relocates because of an act or acts of actual or threatened domestic or family violence by the other party.

In determining whether a party has satisfied either of the above requirements, the court may consider attempts by one party to interfere with the other party's regular contact with the child. [Fam C §3046\(b\)](#).

The court must not consider absence or relocation from the family home as a factor in determining custody in the following situations when ([Fam C §3046\(c\)](#)):

- A protective or restraining order has issued against the party, which excludes the party from the other party's or child's dwelling or otherwise enjoins assault or harassment of the other parent or child, including orders issued under the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act](#) (Fam C §§6300 et seq), civil harassment or workplace violence orders issued under CCP §527.6 or §527.8, or criminal protective orders issued under Pen C §136.2.
- A party abandons a child as provided in Fam C §7822.

As to a party's intent to move to another location as a factor in an award of custody or modification of custody, see §§200.118–200.122.

7. [§200.53] Separation of Siblings

The court may enter a custody order that has the effect of separating siblings only when compelling circumstances dictate that the separation is in the children's best interest. *Marriage of Williams* (2001) 88 CA4th 808, 813–815, 105 CR2d 923 (move-away case). No published state opinion has yet to sanction such a custody award.

8. [§200.54] Emergency or Protective Orders in Effect

Any time a court considers issues of custody or visitation, it is encouraged to make a reasonable effort to ascertain whether any emergency protective orders, protective orders, or other restraining orders concerning the parties or child are in effect. Fam C §3031(a). The court is further encouraged not to make a custody or visitation order that is inconsistent with such orders unless it makes both of the following findings (Fam C §3031(a)):

- The custody or visitation order cannot be made consistent with the emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining order; and
- The custody or visitation order is in the best interest of the child.

If the court grants custody or visitation in a case in which domestic violence is alleged, and an emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining order has been issued, the court must consider whether the child's best interest, based on all circumstances of the case, requires that any custody or visitation arrangement be supervised by a third party specified by the court or whether custody or visitation be suspended or denied. Fam C §§3031(c), 3100(b). In reviewing all circumstances of the case, the court must specifically include consideration of the nature of the acts from which the parent was enjoined and the period of time that has elapsed since the injunctive order was issued. Fam C §3100(b).

If domestic violence is alleged and there is an emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining order, and the court decides

that it is in the child's best interest to allow custody or visitation with the perpetrator, the order must specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the minor child for custody or visitation with the goal of limiting the child's exposure to potential domestic violence or conflict and to ensure the safety of all family members. [Fam C §§3031\(b\), 3100\(c\)](#).

In addition, if a party is staying at a domestic violence shelter or other confidential location, the court's order must be designed to prevent the disclosure of the location of the shelter or other confidential location. [Fam C §§3031\(b\), 3100\(d\)](#).

9. Restriction of Custody to Violent Offenders

a. [§200.55] Registered Sex Offenders; Child Abusers

The court may not award custody or unsupervised visitation to any person who is required to be registered as a sex offender under [Pen C §290](#) when the victim was a minor, or has been convicted of [Pen C §273a](#) (child abuse), [§273d](#) (corporal punishment of child), or [§647.6](#) (child molestation), unless the court finds that there is no significant risk to the child and states its reasons in writing or on the record. [Fam C §3030\(a\)](#).

b. [§200.56] Person Convicted of Rape

Without exception, a person convicted of rape under [Pen C §261](#) may not be awarded custody or visitation of a child conceived as a result of the rape. [Fam C §3030\(b\)](#).

c. [§200.57] Person Convicted of Murder

No person convicted of first-degree murder ([Pen C §189](#)) of the other parent of the child may be awarded custody or unsupervised visitation, unless the court finds that there is no risk to the child's health, safety, and welfare, and states its reasons in writing or on the record. [Fam C §3030\(c\)](#).

In making its finding of no risk to the child, the court may consider, among other factors, the following ([Fam C §3030\(c\)\(1\)–\(3\)](#)):

- The wishes of the child, if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference.
- Credible evidence that the convicted parent was the victim of abuse (as defined in [Fam C §6203](#)), committed by a deceased parent. The evidence may include, but is not limited to, written reports by:
 - Law enforcement agencies.
 - Child protective services or other social welfare agencies.
 - Courts.
 - Medical facilities.

- Other public agencies or private nonprofit organizations providing services to victims of domestic abuse.
- Testimony of an expert witness, qualified under [Evid C §1107](#), that the convicted parent suffers from the effects of battered women's syndrome.

Unless and until a custody or visitation order is issued to the convicted parent, the child may not be permitted to visit or remain in the custody of the convicted parent without the consent of the child's custodian or legal guardian. [Fam C §3030\(c\)](#).

10. [§200.58] Improper Factors

The court may not consider the following factors in determining the suitability of a parent to have custody absent a showing of harm to the child in the particular circumstances:

- *Sex of parent.* [Fam C §3040\(a\)\(1\)](#).
- *Race.* Custody determinations may not be made on the basis of race. *Palmore v Sidoti* (1984) 466 US 429, 104 S Ct 1879, 80 L Ed 2d 421 (trial court improperly removed custody from the mother after mother entered into interracial marriage because it feared possible harm to child because of racial prejudice).
- *Physical disability.* It is impermissible for the trial court simply to rely on a physical disability as prima facie evidence of the person's unfitness as a parent or of probable detriment to the child. *Marriage of Carney* (1979) 24 C3d 725, 736, 157 CR 383.
- *Religion.* Religion is not a factor that should enter into a custody decision unless there is a showing of harm to the child. *Marriage of Murga* (1980) 103 CA3d 498, 505, 163 CR 79 (noncustodial parent or a joint custodial parent may not be prohibited from discussing religion with his or her child or involving the child in the parent's religious activities absent showing that such involvement would be harmful to the child); see also *Marriage of Urband* (1977) 68 CA3d 796, 798, 137 CR 433 (court rejecting contention that mother's religious belief as a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses rendered her unfit to have custody because, among other things, of her belief against blood transfusions and her refusal to permit children to participate in sports, absent compelling evidence that her religious beliefs and observances were harmful to the children).
- *Parents' comparative income.* Comparative income or economic advantage is not a permissible basis for awarding custody. There is no basis for assuming a correlation between wealth and good

parenting or wealth and happiness. If the custodial parent's income is insufficient to provide proper care for the child, the court should award child support rather than remove custody from the parent. *Burchard v Garay* (1986) 42 C3d 531, 539–540, 229 CR 800 (trial court's reasoning that care given by a mother who, because of her work and study must entrust the child to daycare centers and babysitters, is per se inferior to care given by a father who also works, but who can leave the child with a stepmother at home, was not suitable basis for custody order). See also *Marriage of Loyd* (2003) 106 CA4th 754, 759–760, 131 CR2d 80 (trial court erred, in response to modification motion, by changing physical custody from father to mother based on fact that the father would have to place children in daycare).

- *Sexual preference.* A parent's sexual preference alone is not determinative in awarding custody or restricting visitation. Rather, insofar as the court finds it relevant, it is but one factor to be considered, in determining custody. *Nadler v Superior Court* (1967) 255 CA2d 523, 63 CR 352; *Marriage of Birdsell* (1988) 197 CA3d 1024, 243 CR 287 (court order prohibiting homosexual father from exercising overnight visitation with son in presence of other persons known to be homosexual vacated for lack of affirmative showing of detriment of child).
- *Parent's sexual relations.* A parent's sexual conduct is not relevant in awarding custody unless there is compelling evidence that such conduct has significant bearing on the welfare of the child. *Marriage of Wellman* (1980) 104 CA3d 992, 994, 999, 164 CR 148 (abuse of discretion to restrain a custodial parent from having overnight visitors of the opposite sex unless the welfare of the minor children is thereby directly placed in jeopardy); *Marriage of Slayton* (2001) 86 CA4th 653, 661–662, 103 CR2d 545 (mother did not show that father's adultery would adversely affect the child's home environment).

E. Awarding Custody to Nonparent Over Parent's Objection

1. [§200.59] Detriment Test

Before making an order granting custody to a person or persons other than a parent, over the objection of a parent, the court must make a finding that granting custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and that granting custody to the nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child. *Fam C §3041(a)*. Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental to the child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, must not appear in the pleadings. *Fam C §3041(a)*. The court may, in its

discretion, exclude the public from the hearing on this issue. [Fam C §3041\(a\)](#).

In a case decided under [former CC §4600](#) (predecessor statute of [Fam C §3041](#)), the court held that there must be a clear showing that an award to the nonparent is “essential to avert harm to the child.” *In re B.G.* (1974) 11 C3d 679, 698–699, 114 CR2d 444.

As used in [Fam C §3041](#), “detriment to the child” includes the harm caused by removing a child from a stable placement with a person who has assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of his or her parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. [Fam C §3041\(c\)](#). A finding of detriment does not require any finding of unfitness of the parents. [Fam C §3041\(c\)](#).

2. [§200.60] Standard of Proof

Subject to [Fam C §3041\(d\)](#), a finding that parental custody would be detrimental to the child must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. [Fam C §3041\(b\)](#).

Notwithstanding [Fam C §3041\(b\)](#), if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person to whom custody may be given is a person described in [Fam C §3041\(c\)](#) (one who has taken on the role of a parent), this finding will constitute a finding that the custody is in the best interest of the child and that parental custody would be detrimental to the child absent a showing by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. [Fam C §3041\(d\)](#).

F. Visitation Rights

1. [§200.61] Reasonable Visitation by Parent

The court must grant a parent reasonable visitation rights unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. [Fam C §3100\(a\)](#).

In determining what is “reasonable visitation,” the court has broad discretion and may craft a variety of orders. All visitation orders must be made to protect the child’s best interest and must take into account the broad policy of ensuring the child’s health, safety, and welfare, and to the extent consistent therewith, the policy preference for frequent and continuing contact with both parents. See §§200.35, 200.47.

As it does when making a decision on whether to award any form of joint custody, the court must also consider a variety of factors that may create presumptions or be indicators of detriment to the child’s best interest. Such factors include domestic violence, alcohol abuse, illegal drug use, and parenting skills. Such considerations of detriment must also

be balanced against the policy of ensuring frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

- ➡ **JUDICIAL TIP:** Many judges avoid the terms “visitation” and “noncustodial parent” in favor of “parenting or coparenting schedules,” “custody plans,” or “custody time-shares,” even to the extent of crossing out the word “visitation” on Judicial Council forms. In emotionally charged custody disputes, “visitation” and “noncustodial parent” may appear to diminish the childrearing contributions of the parent with less than an equal time share.

2. [§200.62] Visitation by Incarcerated Parent

An incarcerated parent has a right to reasonable visitation with his or her child. Therefore, visitation between children and their incarcerated parents cannot be denied without a detriment finding. *Hoversten v Superior Court* (1999) 74 CA4th 636, 640–641, 88 CR2d 197. The *Hoversten* case outlines some alternative means by which an incarcerated parent can secure meaningful access to the court to represent his or her visitation rights (74 CA4th at 642–644):

- Deferring the action until the parent’s release.
- Appointing counsel for the parent.
- Ordering the transfer of parent to court.
- Using depositions instead of personal appearances.
- Propounding written discovery.
- Conducting hearing by telephone or closed circuit television
- Using services of the family court mediator (Note: Mediation mandatory in contested cases (see §200.74)).

Bar to visitation. An incarcerated parent cannot be granted visitation rights with a child conceived by the parent’s act of rape for which the parent was convicted. See §200.56.

3. [§200.63] Visitation by Nonparents

In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to nonparents having an interest in the welfare of the child. Fam C §3100(a). Provision is also made for reasonable visitation by stepparents, grandparents, and specified relatives of a deceased parent if the court determines that such visitation is in the best interest of the child. Fam C §§3101–3104. Nonparent visitation may be ordered based on stipulation of the parents. *Marriage of Ross & Kelley* (2003) 114 CA4th 130, 140, 7 CR3d 287.

The United States Supreme Court in *Troxel v Granville* (2000) 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49, has set limits on nonparent visitation orders. Several California cases interpreting the state's nonparent visitation laws since *Troxel* have found the laws to be unconstitutional as applied. These cases and the application of the *Troxel* standards are discussed in more detail below.

a. [§200.64] *Troxel* Limits on Visitation

Troxel centered on a Washington State statute, similar to Fam C §§3101–3104, permitting “any person” to petition for visitation and allowing the court to grant visitation “whenever visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Over objections of the child’s mother, the state trial court granted the paternal grandparents extensive visitation of their deceased son’s children. The Supreme Court held that, in the context of grandparent visitation, the statute violated the due process rights of a fit parent and her family to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their family. *Troxel v Granville* (2000) 530 US 57, 64–65, 73, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49. Several California cases since *Troxel* have found court-ordered visitation for parents of a deceased mother or father under Fam C §3102 unconstitutional as applied, although none have held that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. See *Zasueta v Zasueta* (2002) 102 CA4th 1242, 1254–1255, 126 CR2d 245; *Punsly v Ho* (2001) 87 CA4th 1099, 1110, 105 CR2d 139; and *Kyle O. v Donald R.* (2000) 85 CA4th 848, 851, 102 CR2d 476. The court in *Herbst v Swan* (2002) 102 CA4th 813, 125 CR2d 836, found that the application of Fam C §3102 was unconstitutional as applied to visitation request by adult sibling of deceased parent. According to *Troxel*, the court may not rely solely on the best-interest-of-the-child standard when considering nonparent visitation if there is a fit custodial parent. *Troxel v Granville, supra*, 530 US at 67. Such reliance infringes on the fundamental rights of a parent simply because a judge believes a “better” decision could be made. To the extent Fam C §3102 is applied to requests by nonparent relatives for visitation using only a best-interest-of-the-child standard, it is unconstitutional. See *Troxel v Granville, supra*; *Zasueta v Zasueta, supra*; *Punsly v Ho, supra*; and *Kyle O. v Donald R., supra*.

In determining whether to grant visitation to nonparents, the above cases require the court to:

- Determine if the parent is fit. If so, there is a presumption that the fit parent acts in the best interest of the child.
- Give special weight to a fit parent’s determination of what is in the child’s best interest.
- Not shift the burden to the fit parent to show that the visits are not in the child’s best interest.

- Consider whether the fit parent has voluntarily allowed visits, no matter how limited.

In other words, the court may *not* presume that nonparent visits are in the child’s best interest and it *must* presume that a fit custodial parent’s decision is in the child’s best interest. Thus, any order for nonparent visits must be narrowly tailored to advance the interest of the nonparent relatives and the child in maintaining a natural relationship and cannot unduly infringe on the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for a child.

b. [§200.65] Stepparent Visitation

The court may grant visitation to a stepparent if it is determined to be in the child’s best interest, provided such visitation rights do not conflict with the custody or visitation rights of a birth parent who is not a party to the proceeding. [Fam C §3101](#). This statute does not authorize the court to grant joint custody to the stepparent. See *Marriage of Lewis & Goetz* (1988) 203 CA3d 514, 517, 250 CR 30. Visitation under [Fam C §3101](#) is not available to a natural parent who has relinquished the child to adoption. *Marckwardt v Superior Court* (1984) 150 CA3d 471, 478–479, 198 CR 41. But see [Fam C §3100\(a\)](#) (visitation may be granted to “any other person” having an interest in the child’s welfare).

If a birth parent objects to visitation of a stepparent, the rationale of *Troxel* and the California cases interpreting it apply (see [§200.64](#)), and the court should in most cases respect the wishes of the birth parent. *Marriage of James W.* (2003) 114 CA4th 68, 72–75, 7 CR3d 461 (court ordered stepparent visitation without applying presumption favoring birth parent’s decision that visitation was not in child’s best interest; [Fam C §3101](#) found unconstitutional as applied).

A stepparent visitation order may interfere with the custody or visitation rights of a birth parent who is not a party to the proceeding. [Fam C §3101\(c\)](#).

If a protective order under [Fam C §6218](#) (part of the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act](#)) has been directed to a stepparent, the court must consider whether the best interest of the child requires that any visitation by the stepparent be denied. [Fam C §3101\(b\)](#).

c. [§200.66] Visitation by Relatives of Deceased Parent

If a minor’s parent is deceased, the deceased parent’s children, siblings, parents, and grandparents may be granted reasonable visitation with the child if the court finds that such visitation would be in the child’s best interest. [Fam C §3102\(a\)](#).

Before granting such visitation to persons other than a grandparent, the court must consider the amount of personal contact between the party seeking visitation and the child before the application for the visitation

order. [Fam C §3102\(b\)](#). If the living parent objects to visitation of relatives of the deceased parent, the *Troxel* analysis, discussed in [§200.64](#), is applicable, and the court should in most cases respect the wishes of the legal parent. See *Kyle O. v Donald R.* (2000) 85 CA4th 848, 863, 102 CA4th 476 (fit parent presumed to act in child's best interests, and his or her decision regarding the amount of visitation and preference for less structured and more spontaneous manner of visitation is given deference).

The family of a deceased parent may not seek visitation if a person other than a stepparent or grandparent has adopted the child. [Fam C §3102\(c\)](#).

[Family Code §3102](#) has withstood constitutional review even though it may allow for nonparent visitation over the objection of two fit parents. *Fenn v Sherriff* (2003) 109 CA4th 1466, 1 CR3d 185 (*Troxel* requirement that parental decisions be given special weight does not mean they are insulated from any court intervention).

d. [\[§200.67\]](#) Grandparent Visitation

[Family Code §§3103 and 3104](#) authorize the court to award visitation to grandparents when both parents are still living. Note that under [Fam C §3103](#), grandparents may seek visitation in any custody proceeding between the parents, while under [Fam C §3104](#), grandparents may bring an independent petition to seek visitation.

Under [Fam C §3103](#), grandparent visitation claims are incidental to a custody proceeding between the parents that is properly before the court. Thus, the grandparents must be joined in the action between the parents. In contrast, [Fam C §3104](#) was adopted to fill the gap in cases where neither parent had died ([Fam C §3102](#)) and there was no custody proceeding between the parents pending ([Fam C §3103](#)). See *White v Jacobs* (1988) 198 CA3d 122, 124–125, 243 CR 597.

Unlike the broad general statute for nonparent visitation when a parent is deceased ([Fam C §3102](#)), California's specific grandparent visitation statutes when both parents are still living do not appear to run up against the constitutional limitations established in *Troxel*. See *Lopez v Martinez* (2000) 85 CA4th 279, 287–288, 102 CR2d 71. Both [Fam C §§3103 and 3104](#) contain rebuttable presumptions affecting the burden of proof that visitation with a grandparent is not in the child's best interest if a parent opposes such visits. [Fam C §§3103\(d\), 3104\(e\), \(f\)](#). One California court, in a case in which review has been granted, has interpreted the constitutional limitations of *Troxel* as requiring grandparents who seek visitation under [Fam C §3104](#) (and presumably also under [Fam C §3103](#)) to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer harm if visitation is not ordered. *Marriage of Harris* (review granted Jan. 3, 2002, S101836; superseded opinion at 92 CA4th 499, 112 CR2d 127).

(1) [§200.68] Family Code §3103

When there is an action under [Fam C §3021](#), a grandparent who is permitted to join the action and seek visitation is subject to several statutory requirements other than the rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof discussed in [§200.67](#):

- The grandparent must give notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to each parent of the child, to any stepparents, and to any person who has physical custody of the child, or to the attorneys of record of the parties to the proceedings. [Fam C §3103\(c\)](#).
- No visitation rights may be ordered if they would conflict with the custody or visitation rights of a birth parent who is not a party to the proceeding. [Fam C §3103\(e\)](#).
- If a protective order under [Fam C §6218](#) (part of the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act](#)) has been directed to the grandparent seeking visitation, the court must consider whether the best interest of the child requires that visitation by the grandparent be denied. [Fam C §3103\(b\)](#).
- Court-ordered grandparent visitation may not be used as a basis for or against a change of residence of the child, although it is one of the factors the court must consider in ordering a change of residence. [Fam C §3103\(f\)](#).
- The court may exercise its discretion to allocate the percentage of grandparent visitation between the parents for purposes of calculating guideline child support ([Fam C §3103\(g\)\(1\)](#)) and may order a parent or grandparent to pay to the other an amount for transportation ([Fam C §3103\(g\)\(2\)\(A\)](#)) or basic expenses related to the visitation ([Fam C §3103\(g\)\(2\)\(B\)](#)). “Basic expenses” includes medical expenses, daycare costs, and other necessities. [Fam C §3103\(g\)\(2\)\(B\)](#). Note that only costs essential to facilitate the grandparent’s visitation may be assessed against the grandparent. *Marriage of Perry* (1998) 61 CA4th 295, 312–314, 71 CR2d 499 (trial court erred when it assessed costs of counseling for the child when there was insufficient evidence to show that counseling was necessary to facilitate or redress problems arising during grandmother’s visitation).

(2) [§200.69] Family Code §3104

When there is no pending custody action between living parents, grandparents may file an independent petition for a visitation order under [Fam C §3104](#). In this case, the petitioner-grandparent must give notice by

personal service under [CCP §415.10](#) to each parent, any stepparent, and any person who has physical custody of the child. [Fam C §3104\(c\)](#).

Before ordering visitation, the court must do both of the following ([Fam C §3104\(a\)](#)):

- Find that there is a preexisting relationship between the grandparent and grandchild that has “engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child.”
- Balance the interest of the child in having visitation with the grandparent against the right of the parents to exercise their parental authority. (Note: The court must balance the interest of the child against parental rights, not the interest of the grandparents.)

These two requirements, together with the rebuttable presumptions affecting the burden of proof that such visits are not in the child’s best interest in the face of parental opposition ([Fam C §3104\(e\)](#), [\(f\)](#)), appear to satisfy the constitutional requirements of *Troxel*. See *Lopez v Martinez* (2000) 85 CA4th 279, 287–288, 102 CR2d 71 (noting that unlike the state statute in *Troxel*, the California statute only allows a petition to be filed when some disruption to the nuclear family has already occurred, and makes clear a court must accord extreme deference to parental authority while considering the best interest of the child); [Fam C §§3104\(e\)](#) (presumption when the natural or adoptive parents agree that there should be no visitation), [3104\(f\)](#) (presumption when a parent who has been awarded sole legal and physical custody in another proceeding or a parent with whom the child resides if there is no custody order objects to the grandparent visitation).

If a grandparent seeks visitation when the natural or adoptive parents are still married, one or more of the following circumstances must exist in order for the grandparent to file his or her visitation petition ([Fam C §3104\(b\)](#)):

- The parents, at the time of filing, are living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis.
- One of the parents has been absent for more than one month without the other spouse knowing the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
- One of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents.
- The child is not residing with either parent.

If at any time a change of circumstances occurs so that none of these circumstances exist, the parent or parents may move the court to terminate the grandparent visitation, and the court must grant the termination. [Fam C §3104\(b\)](#).

The statutory requirements under [Fam C §3104](#) parallel those of a grandparent visitation request under [Fam C §3103](#):

- The court must consider whether the best interest of the child requires that the request for grandparent visitation be denied if a protective order as defined in [Fam C §6218 \(Domestic Violence Prevention Act\)](#) has been directed to the grandparent. [Fam C §3104\(d\)](#).
- No visitation rights may be ordered if they would conflict with a right of custody or visitation of a birth parent who is not a party to the proceeding. [Fam C §3104\(g\)](#).
- Court-ordered grandparent visitation may not be used as a basis for or against a change of residence for the child, although it is one factor the court must consider when ordering a change of residence. [Fam C §3104\(h\)](#).
- The court may allocate the percentage of grandparent visitation between the parents for purposes of calculating guideline child support ([Fam C §3104\(i\)\(1\)](#)) and may order a parent or grandparent to pay to the other an amount for transportation ([Fam C §3104\(i\)\(2\)\(A\)](#)) or basic expenses related to the visitation ([Fam C §3104\(i\)\(2\)\(B\)](#)).

G. [§200.70] Supervised Visits and Exchanges

When there is concern for the safety or welfare of a child during visits with a noncustodial parent, the court may order that the visits be supervised by a relative, friend, or a professional. See [Fam C §§3200 et seq.](#)

1. [§200.71] Court's Determination of Need and Manner of Visitation

The court must make the final decision about the need for and the manner, terms, and conditions of any supervision. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)](#). This decision depends on several factors, including the degree of risk in each case, the financial situation of the parties, and the local resources available for supervision. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)](#). The court may consider recommendations regarding the need for supervision and the level and manner of supervision from the parties, their attorneys, attorney for the child, Family Court Services staff, custody evaluators, therapists, and providers of supervision. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)](#).

- ➡ **JUDICIAL TIP:** The process of obtaining appropriate supervised visitation is one of the most difficult problems for a court. In many situations, an order for supervised visitation is tantamount to an order for no visitation. If the parties cannot afford a

professional or therapeutic visitation supervisor or cannot agree on a nonprofessional supervisor, then there will be no visitation. Judges should determine what resources are available in their county for no cost or low cost supervisory services to ensure contact between the child and the noncustodial parent.

2. [§200.72] Types of Supervised Visit Providers and Qualifications

The Judicial Council has established rules and standards for the qualifications, training, and experience of supervised visit providers. See [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2](#). The goal of the Judicial Council standards, and the court's goal in ordering supervised visitation or exchanges should be to ensure the safety and welfare of the child, adults, and providers of supervision services. [Fam C §3200](#); [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(a\)](#). Once safety is ensured, the best interest of the child is paramount, especially in deciding the manner of supervision. [Fam C §3200](#); [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(a\)](#).

The rules apply to all providers of supervised visitation, whether the supervisor is paid or volunteers, whether he or she is a relative, friend, paid independent contractor, therapist, or works through a supervised visitation agency or center, unless otherwise specified. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(a\)](#). The rules do not apply to supervised visitation exchanges, although they may be helpful in such cases. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(b\)](#).

The rules describe three kinds of supervised visitation providers: nonprofessional, professional, and therapeutic. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)](#).

Nonprofessional provider. A nonprofessional provider is anyone not paid for providing the supervised visitation services. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)\(1\)](#). Unless otherwise ordered by the court or stipulated by the parties, a nonprofessional provider should ([Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)\(1\)](#)):

- Be 21 years of age or older;
- Have no driving under the influence conviction within the last five years;
- Not have been on probation or parole for the last 10 years;
- Have no record of a conviction for child molestation, child abuse, or other crimes against a person;
- Have proof of automobile insurance if transporting the child;
- Have no civil, criminal, or juvenile restraining orders within the last 10 years;

- Have no current or past court orders in which the provider is the person being supervised;
- Not be financially dependent on the person being supervised;
- Have no conflict of interest (see §200.69); and
- Agree to adhere to and enforce the court order regarding supervised visitation.

Professional provider. A professional provider is any person paid for providing supervised visitation services or an independent contractor, employee, volunteer, or intern operating independently or through a supervised visitation center or agency. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)\(2\)](#). A professional provider should meet the same conditions required of a nonprofessional provider, except for the condition that he or she not be financially dependent on the person being supervised. In addition, a professional provider must speak the language of the child and the party being supervised or provide a neutral interpreter over the age of 18. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)\(2\)](#).

Therapeutic provider. A therapeutic provider is a licensed mental health professional paid for providing supervised visitation services including, but not limited to, a psychiatrist, psychologist, clinical social worker, marriage and family counselor, or intern working under direct supervision. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(c\)\(3\)](#).

3. [§200.73] Responsibilities of Supervised Visit Providers

All providers must make every reasonable effort to ensure the safety of all parties during the visitation. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(d\)](#). Professional and therapeutic providers must: (1) receive certain types of training; (2) institute certain safety and security procedures; (3) maintain detailed records of visitation; (4) enforce the terms and conditions of visitation; and, if necessary, (5) suspend or terminate visitation. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(d\)–\(n\)](#).

All providers, including nonprofessional providers, are bound by conflict-of-interest rules that prohibit: (1) financial dependence on the person being supervised; (2) being an employee of the person being supervised; (3) being in an intimate relationship with the person being supervised; and (4) being an employee of the court that orders the supervision unless specified in the employment contract. [Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(f\)](#). In addition, all providers must refuse to discuss the merits of the case or take sides with any of the parties ([Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(f\)](#)) and must advise the parties that there is no confidential privilege during supervision and that they are bound to report any suspected child abuse to appropriate authorities ([Cal Standards J Admin §26.2\(k\)](#)).

H. Mediation of Custody or Visitation Disputes

1. [§200.74] General Provisions

All contested child custody or visitation issues must be referred to mediation ([Fam C §3170\(a\)](#)), and each superior court must provide mediation services and make a mediator available ([Fam C §3160](#)).

The mediator may be a member of the professional staff of a family conciliation court, probation department, or mental health services agency, or any other person designated by the court, but must meet the minimum qualifications required of a counselor of conciliation under [Fam C §1815](#). [Fam C §3164](#).

If the county's board of supervisors has adopted a resolution so authorizing, parties may request mediation of a dispute related to an existing order for custody, visitation, or both, without filing a new order to show cause, and such mediations must be set within 60 days after filing the request. [Fam C §3173](#).

Domestic violence cases that involve disputed custody or visitation issues are also referred to mediation but are handled by Family Court Services under a separate written protocol approved by the Judicial Council, and may include additional services beyond mediation, such as referral to community resources, videotapes, parent education programs, or informational booklets. [Fam C §3170\(b\)](#).

If a stepparent or grandparent has applied for visitation rights as authorized by law, the matter must also be referred to mediation. [Fam C §3171\(a\)](#). In such cases, a natural or adoptive parent who is not a party to the proceeding is not required to participate in mediation, but his or her failure to do so is a waiver of the right to require a hearing on the matter or to object to a settlement reached by the other parties. [Fam C §3171\(b\)](#).

Mediation services are available even if paternity is at issue in the case before the court. [Fam C §3172](#).

2. [§200.75] Purposes of Mediation

The purposes of a family court mediation proceeding are to ([Fam C §§3161, 3181\(b\)](#)):

- Reduce the acrimony that may exist between the parties;
- Develop an agreement ensuring that the child will have close and continuing contact with both parents that is in the best interest of the child, consistent with [Fam C §§3011 and 3020](#); and
- Bring about a settlement of visitation rights that is in the best interest of the child.

3. Types of Mediation

a. [§200.76] Recommending

Currently each county determines by local rule whether it will have recommending or nonrecommending mediation. “Recommending” or “nonconfidential” mediation permits the mediator to submit recommendations to the court as to custody of or visitation with the child. [Fam C §3183\(a\)](#). Such recommendations are authorized only if written local rules permit it. [Fam C §3183\(a\)](#); *Marriage of Rosson* (1986) 178 CA3d 1094, 1104–1105, 224 CR 250, disapproved on other grounds in 13 C4th 25, 38 n10. A mediator may not make a recommendation to the court without first allowing the parties to examine the mediator at a hearing on the issues covered by the recommendation. *McLaughlin v Superior Court* (1983) 140 CA3d 473, 483, 189 CR 479.

A mediator’s recommendations are evidence to be weighed with all other relevant evidence in the case, and it is the court, not the mediator, who is charged with deciding the custody or visitation issues. *Marriage of Rosson, supra*, 178 CA3d at 1104.

b. [§200.77] Nonrecommending

“Nonrecommending” or “confidential” mediation occurs in counties that do not have local rules authorizing a mediator to make recommendations as to custody or visitation. In such counties, the mediator simply reports to the court whether the parties have reached an agreement and, if there is an agreement, the mediator reports the terms of the agreement. [Fam C §§3185–3186](#).

Some counties have adopted local rules that, subject to limited exceptions, follow a policy of strict confidentiality in custody and visitation mediation proceedings, precluding the mediator from testifying or otherwise sharing his or her report or recommendations with the court. See [San Francisco Uniform rule 11.22](#) and [Los Angeles rule 14.3](#) (both counties provide exceptions when the child is perceived as being at risk of harm and when there are threats of death or bodily harm directed to any party).

- ➡ JUDICIAL TIP: Before beginning any family law assignment, the judge should be thoroughly familiar with the local court rules regarding confidentiality of mediation. If the judge is in a non-recommending county, he or she should understand what customary steps are taken to make appropriate orders pending a full hearing on the merits.

c. [§200.78] Confidential Mediation Pilot Program in Selected Counties

Any county selected by the Judicial Council may voluntarily adopt a confidential mediation program that provides for all the following (Fam C §3188(a)):

- The mediator may not make a recommendation as to custody or visitation to anyone other than the disputing parties, except as otherwise provided in Fam C §3188.
- If total or partial agreement is reached in mediation, the mediator may report this fact to the court. When there is a partial agreement, if both parties consent in writing, the mediator may report to the court a description of the issues still in dispute, without specific reference to either party.
- In making a recommendation to the court that counsel be appointed to represent the minor child as described in Fam C §3184 (see §200.84), the mediator may not inform the court of the reasons why it would be in the minor child's best interest to have counsel appointed.
- If the parties have not reached agreement as a result of the initial mediation, Fam C §3188 does not prohibit the court from requiring subsequent mediation that may result in a recommendation as to custody or visitation with the child if the subsequent mediation is conducted by a different mediator with no prior involvement with the case or knowledge of any communication, as defined in Evid C §1040, with respect to the initial mediation. The court, however, must inform the parties that the mediator will make a recommendation to the court regarding custody or visitation in the event that the parties cannot reach agreement on these issues.
- If an initial screening or intake process indicates that the case involves serious safety risks to the child, such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, or serious substance abuse, the court may provide an initial emergency assessment service that includes a recommendation to the court concerning temporary custody or visitation orders in order to expeditiously address those safety issues.

Family Code §3188 shall become operative when funds in the annual Budget Act are appropriated sufficient to implement it. Fam C §3188(b). Once implemented, the provisions of Fam C §3188 will apply only in four or more counties selected by the Judicial Council that currently allow a mediator to make custody recommendations to the court and have more than 1000 family law case filings per year. Fam C §3188(c). The Judicial Council may also make Fam C §3188 applicable to additional counties

that have fewer than 1000 family case law filings per year. [Fam C §3188\(c\)](#).

4. [§200.79] Mediator's Role

The mediator must assess the needs and interests of the child involved in the dispute and use his or her best efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or visitation dispute that is in the best interest of the child as provided in [Fam C §3011](#) (best interest factors). [Fam C §3180](#). See also [Fam C §3161\(b\)](#) (agreement must be consistent with [Fam C §3020](#) policies).

5. Mediation Procedures

a. [§200.80] Notice of Mediation and Hearing

Mediation is to be held before or concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing. [Fam C §3175](#). Notice of the mediation is to be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the parties' last known address, to each party and each party's counsel of record, and, when a stepparent or grandparent is seeking visitation, to the stepparent or grandparent, each parent, and each parent's counsel of record. [Fam C §3176\(a\), \(b\)](#). Notice of mediation under [Fam C §3188](#) (see [§200.75](#)) must state that all communications involving the mediator must be kept confidential between the mediator and the disputing parties. [Fam C §3176\(c\)](#).

b. [§200.81] Confidentiality of Proceedings

Mediation proceedings are private and confidential, and all communications from the parties to the mediator made during the proceedings, whether verbal or written, are considered official information within the meaning of [Evid C §1040](#) (official information privilege). [Fam C §3177](#). Because the privilege under [Evid C §1040](#) belongs to court personnel and not the parties, [Fam C §3177](#) does not give either party a right to raise confidentiality of the mediation process to bar a mediator's testimony if a local court rule permits it. Court personnel receiving the confidential information must not make any disclosure to the public. But the official information privilege does not preclude disclosure of information if received in court under a local court rule. *Marriage of Rosson* (1986) 178 CA3d 1094, 1105, 224 CR 250, disapproved on other grounds in 13 C4th 25, 38.

c. [§200.82] Limits of Agreement

The subject of mediation is limited as follows ([Fam C §3178](#)):

- When involving a contested issue of custody or visitation, the agreement must be limited to resolution of issues relating to parenting plans (how parents and other appropriate parties will share and divide their decision-making and caretaking responsibilities to protect the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child ([Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(c\)\(2\)](#)), custody, visitation, or a combination of these issues.
- When a stepparent or grandparent seeks visitation, the agreement must be limited to resolution of the issues related to that visitation.

d. [§200.83] Interview of Child

The mediator may interview the child when the mediator deems it necessary or appropriate. [Fam C §3180\(a\)](#); [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(e\)\(3\)](#).

e. [§200.84] Issuance of Restraining Orders

Except as provided in [Fam C §3188](#) (see [§200.78](#)), and when consistent with local court rules, the mediator may recommend that restraining orders be issued, pending the determination of the controversy, to protect the well-being of the child. [Fam C §3183\(c\)](#).

f. [§200.85] Appointment of Counsel To Represent Child

Except as provided in [Fam C §3188](#) (see [§200.78](#)), and when consistent with local court rules, the mediator may make a recommendation to the court that counsel be appointed, under [Fam C §§3150–3153](#), to represent the child. Such recommendation must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons explaining why appointment of counsel would be in the child’s best interest. [Fam C §3184](#).

g. Special Procedures When History of Domestic Violence Between Parties

(1) [§200.86] Separate Meetings

When there has been a history of domestic violence between the parties or a [Fam C §6218](#) protective order is in effect, the party alleging domestic violence in a written declaration under penalty of perjury or the party protected by the order may request that the mediator meet with the parties separately and at separate times. [Fam C §3181\(a\)](#).

(2) [§200.87] Presence of Support Person

When a [Fam C §6218](#) protective order is in effect, a support person, as defined in [Fam C §6303\(a\)](#), must be permitted to accompany a party protected by the order during any mediation orientation or session, including separate mediation sessions. [Fam C §6303\(c\)](#). The presence of

the support person does not waive the confidentiality of the mediation. [Fam C §6303\(c\)](#).

h. [§200.88] Exclusion of Counsel or Support Person

The mediator has authority and discretion, when appropriate or necessary, to exclude counsel from the mediation proceedings. [Fam C §3182\(a\)](#); see *Marriage of Slayton* (2001) 86 CA4th 653, 659, 103 CR2d 545 (exclusion of counsel from mediation sessions did not deprive parties of right to counsel when mediator subject to full cross-examination at custody hearing).

The mediator may also exclude a domestic violence support person from the mediation proceeding if the support person participates in the session, acts as an advocate in the session, or disrupts the mediation process. [Fam C §§3182\(b\), 6303\(c\)](#).

6. [§200.89] Procedure When Agreement Is Reached

When the parties reach an agreement in mediation, the mediator must report that agreement to counsel for the parties on the day of mediation or as soon thereafter as practical, but before the agreement is reported to the court. [Fam C §3186\(a\)](#); see also [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(e\)\(8\)\(A\)](#).

No agreement reached at mediation may be confirmed or otherwise incorporated in an order unless each party, in person or through counsel, affirms and assents to the agreement in open court or through written stipulation. [Fam C §3186\(b\)](#). The only exception to this is that the court may confirm or otherwise incorporate a mediation agreement in an order if a party fails to appear at a noticed hearing on the issue involved in the agreement. [Fam C §3186\(c\)](#).

The court is not bound by a custody or visitation agreement reached in mediation and is free to modify such an agreement at any time consistent with and subject to the legislative dictates and public policies set forth in [Fam C §§3020–3032, 3040–3048, 3080–3089, and 3100–3104](#). See [Fam C §3179](#).

☛ **JUDICIAL TIP:** Often one party will state that he or she did not consent to the provisions to the agreement allegedly reached before the mediator. On inquiry, if the court determines the differences are minor, the court can modify the agreement to reflect the true determinations of the parties. However, if the dispute is significant, the court may refer the matter for another mediation with specific instructions to the mediator to resolve the point or points that the contesting party is alleging were not part of his or her agreement.

7. [§200.90] Procedure When Agreement Is Not Reached

When no agreement is reached at mediation or agreement is reached on only some of the issues, the mediator must give the parties a written or oral description of any subsequent court procedures for resolving outstanding issues, including instructions for obtaining temporary orders. [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(e\)\(8\)\(B\)](#).

In a nonrecommending county, the mediator must inform the court in writing that no agreement was reached on the specified issues, and the court may resubmit the matter to mediation or set the matter for hearing. [Fam C §3185\(a\)](#).

In a recommending county, the mediator may also add his or her recommendations to the court as to custody or visitation. [Fam C §§3183, 3185\(a\)](#). The mediator also may recommend that a custody investigation be conducted, under [Fam C §§3110 et seq](#), or that other services be offered to help resolve the dispute before a hearing on the issue. [Fam C §3183\(b\)](#).

In all counties, if the case involves a request for visitation by a stepparent or grandparent, each natural or adoptive parent must be given an opportunity to appear and be heard on the issue. [Fam C §3185\(b\)](#).

8. [§200.91] Standards of Practice for Mediation

[Family Code §3162](#) sets minimum standards for mediation practice and requires the Judicial Council to develop uniform standards of mediation practice for use throughout California ([Fam C §3162\(a\)](#)). The Judicial Council standards are found in [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210](#) and include:

- Training, education, and experience requirements for mediators ([Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(f\)](#));
- Specific procedures to be followed by mediators in the course of mediation and in communicating with the parties ([Cal Rules of Ct 5.210 \(d\)–\(e\)](#)); and
- Ethics for mediators ([Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(g\)](#)).

Each court must provide mediation services that meet the above standards as well as additional standards set forth in [Cal Rules of Ct 5.210\(d\)](#). Each court must also develop local rules to respond to requests for a change in mediators or to general problems related to mediation. [Fam C §3163](#).

I. [§200.92] Court-Ordered Counseling for Parents and Children

The court may require the parties involved in a custody or visitation dispute, and the minor child, to participate in outpatient counseling with a licensed mental health professional, or through other community programs and services that provide appropriate counseling, including, but not

limited to, mental health or substance abuse services. [Fam C §3190\(a\)](#). The court may order counseling for no more than one year and must ascertain that the program ordered or chosen by the court has counseling available for the designated period of time. [Fam C §3190\(a\)](#).

The court must make the following three findings before it orders counseling ([Fam C §3190\(a\), \(d\)](#)):

- The dispute between the parents, between the parent or parents and the child, between the parent or parents and another party seeking custody of or visitation with the child, or between a party seeking custody or visitation and the child poses a substantial danger to the best interest of the child;
- The counseling is in the best interest of the child; and
- The financial burden created by the court order for counseling does not otherwise jeopardize a party's other financial obligations.

The court must set forth in its findings the reasons why it has found the above criteria are present. [Fam C §3190\(d\)](#).

In determining whether a custody dispute poses a substantial danger to the best interest of the child and thus requires counseling, the court must consider, in addition to any other relevant factors, any history of domestic violence, as defined in [Fam C §6211](#), within the past five years between the parents or the parent and other party seeking visitation or custody with the child or between the parents or such other party and the child. [Fam C §3190\(b\)](#).

The court is barred from ordering the parties to return to court on completion of the counseling. [Fam C §3190\(e\)](#). However, any party may file a new order to show cause or motion after counseling is completed, and the court may again order counseling consistent with the above restrictions. [Fam C §3190\(e\)](#).

1. [§200.93] Goals of Counseling

Counseling must be specifically designed to ([Fam C §3191](#)):

- Facilitate communication between the parties regarding their minor child's best interest;
- Reduce conflict regarding custody or visitation; and
- Improve the quality of parenting skills of each parent.

2. [§200.94] Special Procedure When History of Abuse Between Parties

When there has been a history of abuse by either parent against the child or by one parent against the other parent and when a protective order

as defined in [Fam C §6218](#) is in effect, the court may order the parties to participate in counseling separately and at separate times. [Fam C §3192](#).

3. [§200.95] Cost of Counseling

The court may apportion the costs of the counseling as it deems appropriate if it makes a specific finding that the costs assigned to each party will not otherwise jeopardize the party's ability to meet other financial obligations. [Fam C §3190\(c\)](#). When separate counseling has been ordered under [Fam C §3192](#), each party must bear his or her own costs, unless good cause is shown for a different apportionment ([Fam C §3192](#)). In such cases, the child's counseling is considered "additional child support" ([Fam C §4062](#)), and is to be apportioned accordingly. See [Fam C §§4062–4063](#).

J. Custody Evaluation and Report

1. [§200.96] Appointment of Evaluator

In any contested custody or visitation proceeding, the court may appoint a child custody evaluator to conduct a child custody evaluation and prepare a confidential written report for the court's consideration when the court determines that an evaluation is in the child's best interests. [Fam C §3111\(a\)](#); A child custody evaluator may be a probation officer, a domestic relations investigator, or a court-appointed evaluator. [Fam C §3110](#). [Cal Rules of Ct 5.220\(c\)\(1\)](#). If the parties can agree, the court will typically appoint an evaluator on whom they have agreed. See [Cal Rules of Ct 5.220\(h\)\(10\)](#) (evaluator may not accept appointment except by court order or parties' stipulation).

Unlike mediation, a custody evaluation is not required in all cases. In some cases, however, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny a parent's request for an independent custody evaluation, at least when it appears the parties' self-serving representations might not present the "complete picture" necessary to ascertain the child's best interest. See *Marriage of McGinnis* (1992) 7 CA4th 473, 481, 9 CR2d 182, disapproved on other grounds in 13 C4th 25, 38 n10.

2. [§200.97] Required Qualifications of Evaluators

All evaluators, whether appointed by stipulation or without, must have completed domestic violence and child abuse training as outlined in [Fam C §1816](#), and have complied with training, experience, and continuing education requirements of [Cal Rules of Ct 5.225](#) and [5.230](#). [Fam C §3110.5\(a\)](#); [Cal Rules of Ct 5.220\(g\)](#). These requirements govern both court-connected and private child custody evaluators appointed under [Fam C §3111](#); [Evid C §730](#); or [CCP §2032](#). [Cal Rules of Ct 5.220\(b\)](#).

3. [§200.98] Duties of Evaluator

The evaluator must conduct a “child custody evaluation,” defined in [Cal Rules of Ct 5.220\(c\)](#) as an expert investigation and analysis of the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of the child, with regard to disputed custody and visitation issues. [Fam C §3111\(a\)](#).

The evaluator must prepare and file a report with the court clerk and serve the report on the parties or their attorneys and any counsel appointed for the child under [Fam C §3150](#) at least 10 days before the custody hearing. [Fam C §3111\(a\)](#). Absent waiver, the court may not act on the evaluation report and recommendations unless the parties are given the opportunity to cross-examine the evaluator. *Fewel v Fewel* (1943) 23 C2d 431, 436, 144 P2d 592. See [Fam C §3117\(b\)](#). Each party’s right to cross-examine the evaluator may only be waived after the party or his or her attorney has received the report. [Fam C §3115](#).

Incident to the investigation and report, a custody evaluator may recommend that independent counsel be appointed for the child. See [Fam C §3114](#); see also discussion of appointment of counsel in [§200.60](#).

The report may be received in evidence on stipulation of all interested parties and is competent evidence as to all matters contained in the report. [Fam C §3111\(c\)](#).

4. [§200.99] Special Procedure When History of Domestic Violence Between Parties

A party alleging domestic violence in a written declaration under penalty of perjury or a party who is protected by a [Fam C §6218](#) order may request that the child custody evaluator meet with the parties separately and at separate times. [Fam C §3113](#).

5. [§200.100] Investigation of Sexual Abuse Allegations

Special rules concerning custody evaluations are triggered in cases involving child sexual abuse allegations. [Fam C §3118](#). If, in any contested proceeding involving child custody or visitation rights, the court determines there is a serious allegation of child sexual abuse, the court must order an evaluation, assessment, or investigation under [Fam C §3118](#). But if a child abuse allegation arises in any other circumstances in a custody or visitation proceeding, the court has the discretion to order an evaluation, investigation, or assessment. [Fam C §3118\(a\)](#). A “serious allegation of child sexual abuse” means an allegation based in whole or in part on statements made by the child to law enforcement, a child welfare services agency investigator, any person deemed a mandated reporter, or any other court-appointed personnel, or an allegation that is supported by substantial independent corroboration under [Fam C §3011\(b\)](#). [Fam C §3118\(a\)](#).

The provisions of [Fam C §3118](#) do not apply to any emergency court-ordered partial investigation that is conducted for the purpose of helping the court determine what immediate temporary orders may be necessary to protect and meet the child's immediate needs, nor does it apply when the emergency is resolved and the court is considering permanent child custody or visitation orders. [Fam C §3118\(a\)\(1\)](#).

The provisions of [Fam C §3118](#) do not prohibit a court from considering evidence relevant to determining the safety and protection needs of the child. [Fam C §3118\(a\)\(2\)](#).

On ordering a [Fam C §3118](#) evaluation, investigation, or assessment, the court must consider (a) whether the child's best interest requires issuance of a temporary order requiring supervised visitation with the party against whom the allegations have been made, or (b) suspending or denying visitation outright. [Fam C §3118\(f\)](#).

6. [§200.101] Cost of Investigation

The court must inquire into the financial condition of the parent, guardian, or other person charged with the support of the minor. If the court finds that the parent, guardian, or other person charged with the support of the minor is able to pay all or a portion of the expenses of the investigation, report, and recommendation, the court may make an order for that person to repay the court an amount it deems proper. [Fam C §3112](#).

K. Appointment of Counsel for the Child

1. [§200.102] Request for Appointment

A court may appoint counsel to represent children in family law cases when appropriate. [Fam C §3150\(a\)](#). In disputed custody or visitation proceedings, the court should consider the appointment of an attorney to represent the best interests of the child if requested to do so by either party, the attorney for either party, a mediator, a custody evaluator, a court-appointed guardian ad litem or special advocate, the child or any relative of the child, and also on its own motion. [Cal Standards J Admin §20.5\(a\)](#). If there are two or more children involved in the proceedings, the court should consider whether there may be such a conflict that one attorney cannot adequately represent each child. [Cal Standards J Admin §20.5\(d\)](#).

2. [§200.103] Factors for Court To Consider

In determining whether to appoint counsel the court should consider whether ([Cal Standards J Admin §20.5\(b\)](#)):

- The dispute is exceptionally intense or protracted.

- Because of the dispute, the child is subjected to stress that might be alleviated by the intervention of counsel representing the child.
- An attorney representing the child would be likely to provide the court with significant information not otherwise readily available or likely to be presented.
- The dispute involves allegations that a parent, a stepparent, or other person with the parent's knowledge has physically or sexually abused the child.
- It appears that neither parent is capable of providing a stable and secure environment.
- The child is capable of verbally expressing his or her view.
- Attorneys are available for appointment who are sensitive to the needs of children and the issues raised in representing them.
- The best interest of the child appears to require special representation.

3. [§200.104] Duties of Appointed Counsel

The child's counsel's role is to gather facts that bear on the best interests of the child, and present those facts to the court, including the child's wishes when appropriate. [Fam C §3151\(a\)](#). The counsel's duties include interviewing the child, reviewing the court files and all accessible relevant records available to both parties, and making any further investigations as the counsel considers necessary to ascertain facts relevant to the custody or visitation hearing. [Fam C §3151\(a\)](#).

4. [§200.105] Cost of Appointed Counsel

Appointed counsel is to receive reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, paid for by the parties and allocated as the court deems appropriate. [Fam C §3153\(a\)](#). "Parties" who may be liable for these fees include third parties joined on custody and visitation issues, but that responsibility is limited to the fees and costs incurred as a result of the third party's custody/visitation claims. *Marriage of Perry* (1998) 61 CA4th 295, 309, 71 CR2d 499. If the court determines the parties together are financially unable to pay all or a portion of the cost of counsel, the county is to pay that portion the parties are unable to afford. [Fam C §3153\(b\)](#).

L. [§200.106] Appointing Special Master

On the agreement of the parties, a referee or special master may be appointed to hear and determine any or all of the issues in an action or proceeding, whether of fact or of law, and to report a statement of

decision, or to ascertain a fact necessary to enable the court to determine an action or proceeding. [CCP §638\(a\), \(b\)](#).

- ➡ **JUDICIAL TIP:** The appointment of a special master can be a useful and economical method for the parties to resolve a myriad of minor matters that might otherwise take them into court. It is particularly useful in those cases when the parties are frequently in court on disputes that do not involve custody, for example, the choice to enroll the child in baseball or soccer, the choice to take art or woodshop in school, or the determination that the exchange time should be 4:30 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. on Thursdays.

When the parties do not agree to have a special master hear a dispute, the court may still appoint one on the motion of any party, or on its own motion, but such reference must be limited to those specific fact determinations set forth in [CCP §639](#), which include financial accountings, discovery disputes or questions, and factual questions related to existing controversies. Any such nonconsensual appointment may not include legal issues or matters pending at the time of the reference. *Ruisi v Thieriot* (1997) 53 CA4th 1197, 1209–1211, 62 CR2d 766; *Marriage of Lloyd* (1997) 55 CA4th 216, 221, 64 CR2d 37.

An order appointing a referee or special master under [CCP §639](#) must be in writing and must include (for nondiscovery appointments) a statement of the reason the referee is being appointed, or (for discovery appointments) the exceptional circumstances requiring the reference, which must be specific to the circumstances of the particular case; the subject matter(s) included in the reference; the name, address, and telephone number of the referee; the maximum hourly rate that the referee may charge, and if requested, the maximum number of hours; and findings concerning the parties' ability to pay for the referee's services. [CCP §639\(d\)](#). See also *Settemire v Superior Court* (2003) 105 CA4th 666, 671–673, 129 CR2d 560 (reference must state specific facts to be resolved; assignment of commissioner to case “for a hearing and findings on any matter of fact upon which information is required by the court” constituted an improper delegation of judicial duties; the reference was imprecise and included several issues, namely, an injunction, custody and visitation, and disposition of property).

If the necessary findings concerning ability to pay are not made, a court may not appoint a referee at a cost to the parties. [CCP §639\(d\)\(6\)\(A\)](#). Finally, an order appointing a discovery referee must be forwarded to the presiding judge. [CCP §639\(e\)](#).

M. Child Abduction Prevention

1. [§200.107] Determining Risk of Abduction

In cases in which the court becomes aware of facts that may indicate that there is a risk of abduction of a child, the court must, either on its own motion or at the request of a party, determine whether measures are needed to prevent the abduction of the child by one parent. [Fam C §3048\(b\)\(1\)](#). To make that determination, the court must consider the risk of the child's abduction, obstacles to location, recovery, and return if the child is abducted, and potential harm to the child if he or she is abducted. To determine whether there is a risk of abduction, the court must consider whether a party ([Fam C §3048\(b\)\(1\)](#))

- Has previously taken, enticed away, kept, withheld, or concealed a child in violation of the right of custody or of visitation of a person, regardless of whether the party acted in compliance with [Pen C §278.7](#) or whether a party has threatened to do any of the foregoing.
- Lacks strong ties to California.
- Has strong familial, emotional, or cultural ties to another state or country, including foreign citizenship. This factor must be considered only if evidence exists in support of another factor specified in [Fam C §3048](#).
- Has no financial reason to stay in California, including whether the party is unemployed, is able to work anywhere, or is financially independent.
- Has engaged in planning activities that would facilitate the removal of a child from California, including quitting a job, selling his or her primary residence, terminating a lease, closing a bank account, liquidating other assets, hiding or destroying documents, applying for a passport, applying to obtain a birth certificate or school or medical records, or purchasing airplane or other travel tickets, with consideration given to whether a party is carrying out a safety plan to flee from domestic violence.
- Has a history of a lack of parental cooperation or child abuse, or there is substantial evidence that a party has perpetrated domestic violence.
- Has a criminal record.

[Family Code §3048\(b\)\(1\)](#) does not affect the applicability of [Pen C §278.7](#) that immunizes persons with a right to custody from the crime of taking, enticing away, keeping, or concealing a child, when that person has a reasonable belief that the child will suffer immediate bodily injury or emotional harm if left with the other parent. [Fam C §3048\(d\)](#).

2. [§200.108] Preventive Measures

If the court makes a finding that there is a need for preventive measures after considering the factors in Fam C §3048(b)(1) (see §200.105), the court must consider taking one or more of the following actions to prevent abduction of the child (Fam C §3048(b)(2)):

- Ordering supervised visitation.
- Requiring a parent to post a bond in an amount sufficient to serve as a financial deterrent to abduction, the proceeds of which may be used to offset the cost of the child's recovery of the child if there is an abduction.
- Restricting the right of the custodial or noncustodial parent to remove the child from the county, California, or the United States.
- Restricting the right of the custodial parent to relocate with the child, unless the custodial parent provides advance notice to, and obtains the written agreement of, the noncustodial parent, or obtains the approval of the court, before relocating with the child.
- Requiring the surrender of passports and other travel documents.
- Prohibiting a parent from applying for a new or replacement passport for the child.
- Requiring a parent to notify a relevant foreign consulate or embassy of passport restrictions and to provide the court with proof of that notification.
- Requiring a party to register a California order in another state as a prerequisite to allowing a child to travel to that state for visits, or to obtain an order from another country containing terms identical to the custody and visitation order issued in the United States (recognizing that these orders may be modified or enforced under the laws of the other country), as a prerequisite to allowing a child to travel to that country for visits.
- Obtaining assurances that a party will return from foreign visits by requiring the traveling parent to provide the court or the other parent or guardian with any of the following:
 - The travel itinerary of the child.
 - Copies of round trip airline tickets.
 - A list of addresses and telephone numbers where the child can be reached at all times.
 - An open airline ticket for the left-behind parent in case the child is not returned.

- Including provisions in the custody order to facilitate use of the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act \(UCCJEA\)](#) ([Fam C §§3400 et seq](#)) and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (implemented under [42 USC §§11601 et seq](#)) such as identifying California as the home state of the child or otherwise defining the basis for the California court's exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, identifying the United States as the country of habitual residence of the child under the Hague Convention, defining custody rights under the Hague Convention, obtaining the express agreement of the parents that the United States is the country of habitual residence of the child, or that California or the United States is the most appropriate forum for addressing custody and visitation orders.
- Authorizing the assistance of law enforcement.

If the court imposes any or all of the conditions listed in [Fam C §3048\(b\)\(2\)](#), those conditions must be specifically noted on the minute order of the court proceedings. [Fam C §3048\(b\)\(3\)](#). If the court determines that there is a risk of abduction that is sufficient to warrant the application of one or more of the preventive measures authorized by [Fam C §3048](#), the court must inform the parties of the telephone number and address of the Child Abduction Unit in the office of the district attorney in the county where the custody or visitation order is being entered. [Fam C §3048\(b\)\(4\)](#).

N. Missing Party or Child

1. [§200.109] Missing Party in Possession of Child

The district attorney of each county is authorized to find a missing party in possession of a child under California's statutory scheme. [Fam C §§3130–3135](#).

If the whereabouts of a party in possession of a child are not known or if there is reason to believe a party ordered to appear personally with a child will not appear, and a petition to determine custody has been filed in a court of competent jurisdiction or a temporary order has issued, the district attorney must take all necessary actions to find the party and the child and procure compliance with the order to appear. [Fam C §3130](#). The district attorney may even file the petition to determine custody. [Fam C §3130](#).

In performing these functions, the district attorney does not represent any party to the custody proceeding but acts on behalf of the court. [Fam C §3132](#).

2. [§200.110] Child Taken or Detained

The district attorney must take all actions necessary to find a party who has taken or detained a child in violation of a custody or visitation order and return the child and violator and help to enforce the custody or visitation order by use of an appropriate civil or criminal proceeding. [Fam C §3131](#).

In performing these functions, the district attorney does not represent any party to the custody proceeding but acts on behalf of the court. [Fam C §3132](#).

3. [§200.111] Temporary Custody Orders

The district attorney may request a temporary custody order when necessary to recover a child who has been concealed or detained in violation of a court order and may recommend that a parent or other person be the party given sole temporary custody to facilitate the return of the child to the jurisdiction of the court. [Fam C §3133](#). If the court determines that it is not in the child's best interest to be placed in the sole temporary custody of the parent or other party recommended by the district attorney, the court must appoint a person to take charge of the child and return the child to the jurisdiction of the court. [Fam C §3133](#).

In addition, the court may issue a protective custody warrant for an unlawfully detained or concealed child if the district attorney presents an affidavit under penalty of perjury that such a warrant is necessary for the district attorney to perform the duties listed in [Fam C §§3130 and 3131](#). [Fam C §3134.5\(a\)](#). The warrant can be dismissed without further court proceedings on the declaration of the district attorney that the child has been recovered or the warrant is no longer necessary. [Fam C §3134.5\(b\)](#).

The district attorney's authority to act under [Fam C §§3130–3134.5](#) is not limited by the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act \(UCCJEA\)](#) ([Fam C §§3400 et seq](#)). [Fam C §3135](#).

4. [§200.112] Costs Incurred by District Attorney

If appropriate, the court must order one or both parties to the proceedings to reimburse the district attorney for actual expenses incurred in finding a missing party or child. [Fam C §3134\(b\)](#).

5. [§200.113] National Crime Information Center Missing Person System

If one or both parents of a child have not appeared in a case, the court, before granting or modifying a custody order, must require the parent or petitioner to submit a certified copy of the child's birth certificate to the court. [Fam C §3140\(a\)](#). The court must then forward the certified copy to the local police or sheriff department, which must check

with the National Crime Information Center Missing Person System to ascertain whether the child has been reported missing or is the victim of an abduction. [Fam C §3140\(a\)](#). The law enforcement agency must report the results of the check to the court. [Fam C §3140\(a\)](#).

The purpose of this requirement is to assure the court that the party petitioning for custody or modification of custody has not abducted the child in violation of an existing court order.

The missing person check is not required if the custody matter before the court also involves a petition for dissolution of marriage or the adjudication of paternity rights or duties and there is proof of personal service of the petition upon the absent parent. [Fam C §3140\(b\)](#).

In addition, the court may waive the requirement of [Fam C §3140](#) for good cause. [Fam C §3140\(c\)](#).

O. [§200.114] Modification of Custody

[Family Code §3022](#) provides that the court may, during the pendency of a proceeding, or at any time thereafter, make such orders for the custody of a child during minority as may be necessary or proper. See also [Fam C §§3087–3088](#). Parents cannot, by stipulation, divest the court of jurisdiction to modify custody and visitation orders. *Marriage of Goodarzirad* (1986) 185 CA3d 1020, 1026, 230 CR 203.

For a discussion of the jurisdictional requirements for modification of custody orders, see [§§200.23–200.26](#). For discussion of modification of custody based on the custodial parent’s intent to relocate with the child to a new residence, see [§§200.126–200.130](#).

1. [§200.115] Showing of Changed Circumstances

To justify a change in custody other than in a temporary custody arrangement (see [§200.117](#)), there must generally be a persuasive showing of changed circumstances affecting the child. The change of circumstances must be substantial; a child will not be removed from the prior custody of one parent and given to the other unless the material facts and circumstances occurring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential or expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a change. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 37–38, 51 CR2d 444; *Marriage of Carney* (1979) 24 C3d 725, 730, 157 CR 383. The rule serves the goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. *Burchard v Garay* (1986) 42 C3d 531, 535, 229 CR 800; *Marriage of Carney, supra*, 24 C3d at 730–731. The burden of showing a sufficient change in circumstances is on the party seeking the change in custody. 24 C3d at 731; *Speelman v Superior Court* (1983) 152 CA3d 124, 128, 199 CR 784. See *Marriage of Dunn* (2002) 103 CA4th 345, 347–349, 126 CR2d 636 (party entitled to

formal court hearing on contested facts relating to the alleged change of circumstances).

Although an alteration of legal custody may not necessarily be as disruptive as an alteration of physical custody, the rule requiring a change of circumstances applies even when a party is only seeking to change legal custody. *Marriage of McLoren* (1988) 202 CA3d 108, 111, 247 CR 897. However, changes in the parenting schedule, affecting the timeshare with each parent, do not normally require such a showing. See §200.117.

2. [§200.116] Requirement of a Prior Determination

The changed circumstance rule applies only when there has been a final judicial determination of custody whether established by the parties' agreement, default judgment, or litigation. *Montenegro v Diaz* (2001) 26 C4th 249, 256, 109 CR2d 575; *Burchard v Garay* (1986) 42 C3d 531, 535, 229 CR 800.

A custody order stipulated by the parties is a final judicial determination of custody for purposes of the changed circumstance rule only if there is a clear, affirmative indication that the parties intended that result. *Montenegro v Diaz, supra*, 26 C4th at 256–259 (orders including detailed visitation schedules and not providing for further hearings did not constitute final judicial custody determinations, when they did not clearly state they were final judgments on custody, and the parties' conduct following entry of orders strongly suggested they did not intend orders to be final); *Marriage of Rose & Richardson* (2002) 102 CA4th 941, 950–953, 126 CR2d 45 (judgment reciting that the parties would meet with a therapist or counselor to resolve custody and visitation issues and, if unsuccessful, would make appointment with Conciliation Court before filing a request for hearing, was not intended to be final custody determination).

3. [§200.117] When Changed Circumstance Rule Does Not Apply

The changed circumstance rule does not apply to a temporary custody arrangement that has been implemented under a pendente lite stipulation, order to show cause, or pretrial order. In such cases, the court may award custody to the noncustodial parent if it determines that it is in the child's best interest regardless of whether circumstances have changed. *Marriage of Lewin* (1986) 186 CA3d 1482, 1485–1489, 231 CR 433.

The rule also does not apply to a modification of the time-share schedule under a joint physical custody order. Modification of a coparenting residential arrangement, without modifying the order for joint physical custody, is not considered a change of custody. *Marriage of Birnbaum* (1989) 211 CA3d 1508, 1513, 260 CR 210.

P. Change of Child’s Residence (“Move-Aways”)

1. [§200.118] Custodial Parent’s Presumptive Right To Move

A parent who has physical custody of a child has a presumptive right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child. *Fam C §7501(a)*; *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 32, 51 CR2d 444 (court may not interfere with that decision unless the move is detrimental to the child). It is reversible error not to consider the custodial parent’s presumptive right to change the child’s residence. *Marriage of Biallas* (1998) 65 CA4th 755, 762, 76 CR2d 717.

2. [§200.119] Reasons for Move

The reason for a move need only be “sound” and in “good faith,” that is, not intended simply to frustrate the other parent’s contact with the children. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 36, 51 CR2d 444; *Marriage of Bryant* (2001) 91 CA4th 789, 793, 110 CR2d 791. As long as good faith reasons for the move exist, the trial court may not question the custodial parent’s judgment in requesting relocation. *Marriage of Edlund & Hales* (1998) 66 CA4th 1454, 1470–1471, 78 CR2d 671.

3. [§200.120] Burden of Proof

Whether a move-away dispute arises in an initial custody determination or after a judicial custody order is in effect, the custodial parent bears no burden of establishing that the move is “necessary.” *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 28–29, 51 CR2d 444. Nor must the custodial parent prove that the move is in the child’s best interest. *Marriage of Biallas* (1998) 65 CA4th 755, 762, 76 CR2d 717. Rather, in move-away cases, the burden rests with the noncustodial parent opposing the move to make a showing that (a) the custodial parent has a bad faith reason for the move, *or* (b) the proposed move would cause detriment to the child. *Marriage of LaMusga* (2004) 32 C4th 1072, 1078, 12 CR3d 356; *Marriage of Burgess*, *supra*, 18 C4th at 37–38. See *Marriage of Campos* (2003) 108 CA4th 839, 842–844, 134 CR2d 300 (court erred in denying noncustodial parent evidentiary hearing solely on the basis that the custodial parent lacked any bad faith reason for the move; noncustodial parent has right to present evidence that custodial parent’s good faith move would be detrimental to child).

4. [§200.121] Order Conditioning Relocation on Prior Consent

If a stipulated custody order requires the custodial parent to obtain the other parent’s consent or a court order before relocating with a child,

the custodial parent must show his or her decision to move was made in good faith, and the opposing noncustodial parent retains the burden to show that relocating the child would cause detriment to the child. *Marriage of Abrams* (2003) 105 CA4th 979, 986–990, 130 CR2d 16 (move-away provision was merely a means of ensuring that the noncustodial parent had notice of, and opportunity to contest, any impending move).

5. [§200.122] “Frequent and Continuing Contact With Both Parents”

The statutory policy encouraging “frequent and continuing contact with both parents” (Fam C §3020(b)) cannot be interpreted as precluding an award of sole custody of a child to a parent who intends to move, or requiring the moving parent to demonstrate that relocation is “necessary.” *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 34, 51 CR2d 444. Although the court may consider the effect of the move on a child’s relationship with the nonmoving parent, it is not restricted to any particular formula for contact or visitation. 13 C4th at 36; *Ruisi v Thieriot* (1997) 53 CA4th 1197, 1204, 62 CR2d 766.

6. Effect of Move on Initial Custody Determinations

a. [§200.123] Best Interest Standard

A move-away contest between parents that arises at an initial custody adjudication is governed by the same standards and analysis applicable to any custody dispute. The court has broad discretion, and is to look to all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the child. This includes the mandatory factors set forth in Fam C §3011, including the health, safety, and welfare of the child; any history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the other parent; and the nature and amount of contact with both parents. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 31–32, 51 CR2d 444.

b. [§200.124] Prejudice to Child

As part of the initial custody order, the court must take into account the custodial parent’s presumptive right to change the child’s residence as long as the removal would not be prejudicial to the child’s rights or welfare. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 32, 51 CR2d 444. Although the child’s interest in the continuity of placement with the primary caretaker will most often prevail, the court may consider the effects of a move-away as it bears on the nature of the child’s contact with both parents (including *de facto* custody arrangements) and the child’s age, community ties, and health and education needs. When appropriate

under Fam C §3042(a), the court must also take into account the child's preferences. 13 C4th at 39.

c. [§200.125] Continuity and Stability in Custody

The longer a de facto custody arrangement has been in place, the more likely it is that the court will not disrupt it, even if it means the children will be moving away from the other parent. The “paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements.” *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 32–33, 51 CR2d 444. When one parent has maintained custody for a significant period, the other parent seeking custody will bear the burden of persuading the court that a change of the primary caretaker arrangement is in the child's best interests. 13 C4th at 37. Therefore, the court must look to the substance of the custodial relationship for the great majority of the time just before the move away to determine which parent bears the burden of proof. *Marriage of Whealon* (1997) 53 CA4th 132, 143, 61 CR2d 559.

7. Move as Ground for Modification of Existing Custody Order

a. [§200.126] In General

Many aspects of move-away disputes during an initial custody determination are applicable when a parent who has sole physical custody under an existing judicial custody order seeks to relocate with the children. The relocating parent has a presumptive right to move, and bears no burden of demonstrating that the move is necessary. See §§200.118, 200.120. See *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 37 n8, 51 CR2d 444 (considerations and interests in both types of custody matters closely interrelated).

b. [§200.127] Changed Circumstances Rule

As in any other proceeding to modify an existing order, the court must preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child's best interest. *Marriage of LaMusga* (2004) 32 C4th 1072, 1088–1089, 12 CR3d 356. If there is an existing custody order and the custodial parent requests to relocate with the child, the noncustodial parent bears the initial burden of showing that the proposed move would cause detriment to the child, requiring the court to reevaluate the existing order. 32 C4th at 1078. The likely impact of the proposed move on the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child is a relevant factor in

determining whether the move would cause detriment to the child. *Marriage of LaMusga, supra*. Bad faith conduct by the custodial parent, such as attempting to relocate simply to frustrate the noncustodial parent's contact with the child, may also be relevant in determining custody arrangement. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 36, 51 CR2d 444.

c. [§200.128] Court's Discretion in Light of Child's Best Interest

If the noncustodial parent makes an initial showing of detriment, the court must determine whether a change of custody is in the child's best interest. *Marriage of LaMusga* (2004) 32 C4th 1072, 1078, 12 CR3d 356.

The court should consider the following factors when deciding whether to modify a custody order in response to a custodial parent's request to change the child's residence (32 C4th at 1101):

- The child's interest in stability and continuity in the custodial arrangement;
- The distance of the move;
- The age of the child;
- The child's relationship with both parents;
- The relationship between the parents including, but not limited to, their ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the interest of the child above their individual interests;
- The child's wishes if the child is mature enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate;
- The reasons for the proposed move; and
- The extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody.

d. [§200.129] Joint Physical Custody

A different analysis applies when parents share joint physical custody under an existing custody order and one parent wishes to relocate with the children. An order for joint custody may be modified or terminated on the petition of one or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is shown that the best interest of the child requires modification or termination of the order. *Fam C §3087*. In these circumstances, the trial court must determine de novo what arrangement for primary custody is in the child's best interest. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 40 n12, 51 CR2d 444. This different analysis arises out of the disruption of the status quo inherent in a move-away case when there is a genuine joint physical custody, because it is unavoidable that the existing custody arrangement

will be disrupted. *Marriage of Whealon* (1997) 53 CA4th 132, 142, 61 CR2d 559.

e. [§200.130] De Facto Shared Physical Custody

A de novo determination is required even when the parent who wishes to relocate was awarded primary physical custody under an existing custody order, but the parents worked out an actual joint physical custody arrangement. *Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 40 n12, 51 CR2d 444; *Brody v Kroll* (1996) 45 CA4th 1732, 1736–1737, 53 CR2d 280.

The de novo consideration rule is triggered only if the parents in substance genuinely shared joint physical custody of the child for significant periods of time. *Marriage of Whealon* (1997) 53 CA4th 132, 137, 143, 61 CR2d 559. If the nonmoving parent has only nominal physical custody or liberal visitation, and the vast majority of the child's time is spent with the moving parent, the normal changed circumstance rule applies, and the nonmoving party must establish that a change of custody is warranted under the new circumstances of the move. 53 CA4th at 142.

Case law provides some guidance on differentiating actual joint physical custody from sole custody with liberal visitation:

- Joint physical custody: Parent with whom the children do not reside sees them four- to five-times a week. *Brody v Kroll, supra*.
- Joint physical custody: Children shuttle back and forth between parents spending equal time with each parent. *Marriage of Whealon, supra*.
- Sole custody with mother: Father has children 20 percent of time (alternate weekends and two weekday evenings for dinner). *Marriage of Lasich* (2002) 99 CA4th 702, 715, 121 CR2d 356.
- Sole custody with mother: Father has children 30 percent of time (Thursday evening to Friday morning, alternate extended weekends from Friday evening to Monday morning). *Marriage of Biallas* (1998) 65 CA4th 755, 760, 76 CR2d 717.

☛ **JUDICIAL TIP:** When a parent has a time-share of 45 percent or more, courts generally characterize the parenting arrangement as joint custody. If the parent's time-share is less than 30 percent, courts will generally find that sole custody resides with the other parent. In custody situations when the parent has more than 30 percent visitation but clearly less than equal time with the primary custodial parent, the court may look to other factors to determine whether, in fact, the parties have a joint custodial type of arrangement, e.g., parent visits during the week to help the child

with homework, and participation in health and doctor visits, education conferences, or extracurricular activities, over and above the parent's clearly designated custody time.

8. [§200.131] International Move-Aways

When children are being moved to a foreign country, the court should take into consideration the following concerns (*Marriage of Condon* (1998) 62 CA4th 533, 546–547, 73 CR2d 33):

- The impact of the child being moved to a different culture,
- The impact of distance on the ability of the noncustodial parent to visit and maintain his or her relationship with the child, and
- Issues regarding jurisdiction of orders.

The jurisdiction issue is the most difficult to resolve, and it may be necessary for the court to obtain a concession from the custodial parent that he or she would remain subject to the jurisdiction of the California court, or require the custodial parent to post a bond or other security that would be forfeited if he or she failed to comply with the custody order. 62 CA4th at 559–562. See also *Marriage of Abargil* (2003) 106 CA4th 1294, 1302–1304, 131 CR2d 429 (trial court directed to require relocating parent to post substantial financial bond and to register judgment with Israeli government; judgment also modified to prohibit parent from attempting to modify judgment except on application to a California court).

9. [§200.132] Minimizing Effect of Move

The statutory policy encouraging “frequent and continuing contact” with both parents (Fam C §3020(b)) should be considered by the court in all move-away cases. In leaving custody with the move-away parent, the court may accommodate Fam C §3020(b) as illustrated by the following examples:

- Ordering more liberal visitation, or by expanding school vacation visitation (*Marriage of Burgess* (1996) 13 C4th 25, 40, 51 CR2d 444);
- Ordering the moving parent to bring the child back to California on a monthly basis (*Marriage of Whealon* (1997) 53 CA4th 132, 139, 61 CR2d 559);
- Ordering four blocks of time-share in California, totaling 78 days, to coincide with the children's school holidays in Australia (*Marriage of Condon* (1998) 62 CA4th 533, 552, 73 CR2d 33);
- Awarding ten-weeks-per-year visitation in California, plus a right to visit the children in New Mexico for as many weekends as the

noncustodial parent desires, in addition to visiting the children for their birthdays (*Marriage of Bryant* (2001) 91 CA4th 789, 793, 794, 110 CR2d 791);

- Ordering custodial mother moving to Spain to pay for the children's visits to California twice a year, to finance father's two-week visitation in Spain, and to provide for computer equipment to encourage internet communications and video-conferencing between the father and children (*Marriage of Lasich* (2002) 99 CA4th 702, 711, 121 CR2d 356);
- Allocating visitation transportation expense to the custodial parent (*Marriage of Burgess, supra*) and
- Requiring custodial parent to provide transportation of the children to the noncustodial parent's home (*Marriage of Burgess, supra*).

Q. [§200.133] Calendar Preference

If custody is the sole contested issue in a case, the case must be given preference over other civil cases (except for matters to which special precedence may be given by law), for assigning a trial date, and the case shall be given an early hearing. Fam C §3023(a). If there are other contested issues in addition to custody, the court must order a separate trial on the custody issue. The separate trial must be given preference for assigning a trial date as described under Fam C §3023(a). Fam C §3023(b).

R. [§200.134] Termination of Custody Order

A custody order terminates when:

- The child reaches 18 years of age (Fam C §3022);
- The child becomes emancipated by entering into a valid marriage, is on active duty with the United States armed forces, or has received a declaration of emancipation under Fam C §7122 (Fam C §§7002, 7050(b)); or
- The child or custodial parent dies. See *Guardianship of Donaldson* (1986) 178 CA3d 477, 485, 223 CR 707 (when father died, mother entitled to sole custody of children whose custody had been granted to father in marital dissolution action). Fam C §3010(b).

IV. SAMPLE FORMS

A. [§200.135] Written Form: Order Appointing Counsel for Minor

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF _____

Petitioner _____)	NO.
)	
)	ORDER APPOINTING
and _____)	COUNSEL FOR MINOR
)	
)	
Respondent _____)	

THE COURT FINDS

Under [Family Code sections 3150\(a\)](#), the Court finds the interest of the minor child(ren) in this case will be best served by the appointment of private counsel to represent the minor child(ren).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

APPOINTMENT:

1. Under [Family Code sections 3150–3153](#), the Court appoints [name, address, and telephone number of court-appointed counsel] as attorney for the minor child(ren) [*name(s) of child(ren) and date(s) of birth*].

2. The parents [names, address(es) and telephone number(s) of mother and father] are ordered to keep the child(ren)'s attorney informed of current addresses and phone numbers at all times.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION:

3. The attorney for the child(ren) shall have notice of any and all proceedings, including any requested examinations affecting the child(ren).

4. The attorney for the child(ren) shall have access to any and all documents, reports, and test results relating to the child(ren) from therapists, physicians, school, and mental health professionals.

5. The parties shall provide the attorney for the child(ren) with information about the names, addresses and telephone numbers for all individuals involved with the treatment, care, daycare, and education of the child(ren).

6. The attorney for the child(ren) may contact any Family Court Services evaluator, private evaluator, or [*special master/referee*] appointed by the Court or hired by the parties and review all Family Court Services files relevant to this case.

DUTIES:

7. The duties of the attorney for the child(ren) include interviewing the child, reviewing the court files and all accessible relevant records available to both parties, and making any further investigations as the attorney considers necessary to ascertain facts relevant to the custody or visitation hearing.

8. The attorney for the child(ren) may introduce and examine his or her own witnesses, present arguments to the court concerning the welfare of the child(ren), and participate further in the proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child(ren).

9. The attorney for the child(ren) may be asked by the Court to prepare a written statement of issues and contentions setting forth the facts that bear on the best interest of the child(ren).

FEES:

10. The Court will order the parties to pay the fees and costs of the child(ren)'s attorney in proportions that are deemed by the Court to be just. If payment for fees and costs is made by the County of [*name*], the Court may order reimbursement to the County.

11. If any party believes he or she is unable to pay for the fees and costs of the attorney representing the child(ren), the party must immediately complete and file with the Court a Financial Declaration explaining his or her financial circumstances. If the financial circumstances change, the party must file a new declaration.

12. The attorney for the child(ren) may request payment of fees after completing [*number*] hours of work on the case, or when representation has been concluded. The attorney for the child(ren) may request fees by ex parte application, and shall serve copies of the application on all parties.

13. In determining how much each party shall pay as fees and costs to the child(ren)'s attorney under current statutory and case law, the Court

will consider the needs of the parties, the ability of the parties to pay, and the extent to which the conduct of each party and the party's attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, when possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF COUNSEL:

Attorney for Mother

Attorney for Father

DATED: _____

JUDGE/COMMISSIONER/REFEREE

**B. [§200.136] Written Form: Stipulation and Order for Private
Child Custody Evaluation**

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF _____

Petitioner _____

)

NO.

)

and

)

)

)

)

Respondent _____

)

**STIPULATION AND ORDER
FOR PRIVATE CHILD
CUSTODY
EVALUATION**

It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties that the following orders may be made by the Court:

1. *[The parties/Counsel]* shall deliver a copy of this stipulation and order to the evaluator prior to the commencement of the evaluation.

2. The Court appoints *[name, address, and telephone number of evaluator]* as the Court's expert under [Evidence Code section 730](#) for the purposes of conducting a custody evaluation in this proceeding.

3. The parties shall cooperate in the evaluation as directed by the evaluator. The parties are directed to participate in such testing and evaluation as the expert directs, including making themselves and the child(ren) available as needed for testing and interviews.

4. The parties shall make financial arrangements with the expert forthwith. The evaluation will not commence until after the parties have made financial arrangements for payment acceptable to the expert.

The parties stipulate that the cost of the evaluation shall be allocated as follows: *[terms of allocation]*.

[Or]

The parties do not agree to the allocation of the cost of the evaluator. It is agreed that *[name]* shall advance the necessary funds to employ the expert subject to allocation by the Court.

[Or]

The parties do not agree on how to allocate the cost of the evaluation but agree that the Court may make such allocation. The Court allocates the costs of the evaluator as follows: to father and to mother].

5. No party or attorney for a party shall initiate ex parte contact with the evaluator, either orally or in writing, to discuss the merits of the case. Nothing in this order prohibits the evaluator from contacting either party or attorney. Any contact with the evaluator, initiated by the attorneys or parties, shall be by conference call with both attorneys or parties representing themselves on the phone at the same time with the evaluator. Contact may be made to arrange appointments without the need of a conference call.

6. Any correspondence to the evaluator and/or any written materials, including documents, declarations, or records provided to the evaluator, shall be mailed simultaneously or provided simultaneously to the other party and/or *[his/her]* attorney.

7. The evaluator shall inform the minor child(ren) that statements made by *[him/her/them]* to the evaluator may not be confidential, and that it is possible that *[his/her/their]* parents will be informed of *[his/her/their]* statements.

8. The parties are specifically restrained and enjoined from discussing with or in the presence of the child(ren), statements made by the child(ren) to the evaluator.

9. Nothing in this stipulation limits the ability of the Court to control the conduct of these proceedings to protect the best interest of the child(ren).

10. The evaluator shall not acquire information, oral or written, from other professionals unless appropriate releases have been signed.

11. At the conclusion of the evaluation, the expert shall provide a written report to all parties ten (10) days before the hearing. This expert's report shall be received in evidence without foundation and notwithstanding any hearsay objection, unless a party files and serves written objections five (5) days after receipt of the report.

12. The parties are enjoined and restrained from discussing with or in the presence of their minor child(ren), specific facts, and issues or positions relating to custody or visitation, in a manner which disparages the other party or with the intent to influence the child(ren) with respect to custody and/or visitation. The parties shall not discuss the contents of the evaluation report with the minor child(ren) nor discuss the report in *[his/her/their]* presence. The minor child(ren) shall not be permitted to see or read the evaluation report nor have it read in *[his/her/their]* presence.

13. Pending further order of the Court, counsel for the parties may permit their clients to read and review the report in the presence of their attorneys. Attorneys shall not provide copies of the report to the parties absent a specific court order.

14. Parties in propria persona may review and read the report at Family Court Services. The court-appointed expert shall serve *[the original/a copy of the report]* to Family Court Services where it will be maintained for the purpose of review. Parties shall not be provided copies of the report absent a specific court order.

15. Copies of the report shall not be released to the parties without court order, although the parties shall be allowed to review the report.

16. No report may be attached to a pleading without written leave of the Court.

17. Any violation of the provision of this order may result in the imposition of sanctions.

We have read the entire stipulation and order, understand it, and request that the Court make our stipulation the Court's order. We waive further notice of this order; the order may be granted by a judge pro tempore, commissioner, or referee of the Court.

Petitioner

Respondent

Attorney for Petitioner

Attorney for Respondent

ORDER

Upon stipulation of the parties and good cause therefore, the stipulation of the parties is accepted and hereby ORDERED.

DATED: _____
JUDGE/COMMISSIONER/REFEREE

**C. [§200.137] Stipulation and Order for Appointment of Court’s
Expert for Custody Evaluation**

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF _____

Petitioner_____)	NO.
)	
)	
)	STIPULATION AND ORDER
and)	FOR COURT’S EXPERT
)	FOR CUSTODY
)	EVALUATION
Respondent_____)	

PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES as hereinafter set forth, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Court appoint *[name]* as the Court’s expert, under [Evidence Code section 730](#), for purpose of a custody evaluation in this proceeding.

2. The evaluator shall formulate *[his/her]* recommendations based on what is perceived by the evaluator to be in the best interest of the child(ren) in order to promote the development, emotional adjustment, and psychological well-being of the child(ren).

3. The evaluator has quasi-judicial immunity.

4. The parties shall both immediately contact Dr. *[name]* to set an initial appointment time. Thereafter, the parties shall cooperate in all ways in the evaluation as requested by the evaluator, and shall participate in such testing and interviews as directed by the evaluator. The parties shall commence psychological testing with whomever the evaluator recommends as soon as possible. The parties agree to cooperate with a request to submit to tests for the use of drugs and alcohol. These may

include the provision of urine or blood or hair samples to an independent laboratory at the direction of the evaluator. The evaluator may also request that the parents be assessed by an independent specialist such as a substance abuse specialist, a neuropsychologist, or other specialist depending on the evaluator's concerns. The evaluator shall have the authority to: interview all members of the immediate and/or extended family of both parents at [his/her] sole discretion and request; interview any and all other persons whom the evaluator deems, in [his/her] sole discretion, to have relevant information; and determine the protocol of all interviews and sessions. It is the intention of parties to complete this evaluation expeditiously. Therefore, consistent with the evaluator's schedule, the parties agree to schedule meetings requested by [him/her]. Both parties shall make the scheduling of appointments with the evaluator a priority and shall set appointments with [him/her] at a time requested by the evaluator.

5. The parties shall execute and sign any and all releases for records and information requested by the evaluator for the purpose of obtaining information from outside sources, including, but not limited to: psychiatrists, mediators, psychologists, social workers, teachers and schools, physicians, police departments, hospitals, and child protection workers. This includes past records as well as reports from professionals who may be involved with any of the parties at the time of litigation, and includes records and information regarding both parties, as well as their child(ren).

6. All parties must understand that information obtained by the evaluator and opinions formed by [him/her] during the evaluation are not confidential. The evaluator shall have the freedom to communicate at [his/her] sole discretion any and all information with any party whom [he/she] determines may require such information to further the best interests of the child(ren), including the Court, either or both attorneys, either or both parents, therapists involved with the parties and/or child(ren), or any other party at the sole discretion of the evaluator, so that [he/she] shall have full opportunity to explore all pertinent information with both parties.

7. Regarding communication with attorneys, both attorneys are invited to send the evaluator any and all material they consider relevant. Copies of such information shall be provided to the other attorney. Neither attorney may contact the evaluator at any time during the evaluation except with the prior consent of the other attorney. At the sole discretion of the evaluator, [he/she] may communicate with either attorney separately or both together to obtain information, to facilitate the settlement process, and/or protect the child(ren) at any time during and subsequent to the evaluation. The evaluator has the freedom to decide the best ways to disseminate the results and the report. These may include, but are not limited to, meeting with either or both of the parties,

meeting with both attorneys together, and sending the report to the Court or to Family Court Services. If one attorney refuses an invitation to participate in a joint conference, the evaluator may meet with the other attorney. The evaluator shall not have any communication or meeting with only one attorney as outlined above unless [he/she] first notifies both attorneys before such meeting that [he/she] is going to do so.

8. The evaluator may, at [his/her] sole discretion, obtain consultation from other professionals, for purposes of obtaining a reaction, case review, or to obtain access to specific expertise. The consultant is bound to maintain confidentiality regarding the information learned.

9. It is assumed, unless otherwise ordered by the court, that the evaluator will attend the settlement conference, and that fees for [his/her] attendance at the settlement conference will be jointly paid by the parties before such attendance.

10. It is understood that the evaluator is serving under the Court's appointment and, if required to testify by either party, shall testify as the Court's impartial witness and not as an advocate for either party. It is understood further that the evaluator's opinions and recommendations may favor one party, but the evaluator's report, reevaluation (if any), preparation for court appearance, and testimony to the Court are all part of this court-ordered custody evaluation. If either party requires the evaluator to testify at a trial or hearing, it is understood that such party shall be required to deposit an additional retainer with the evaluator to pay for the following: preparation for court testimony, court testimony, and any other time spent in completing the evaluation and providing necessary input to the Court. Both parties must recognize that the evaluator may not ultimately support their respective positions in litigation, but that they nevertheless must still fulfill their obligation to pay the court-ordered percentage of the fees, despite the fact that the evaluator may testify in court or prepare reports in support of the other parent. The Court reserves jurisdiction to allocate the costs of testimony and postevaluation services provided by the evaluator.

11. When there is a significant passage of time between the submission of the evaluator's report and the trial date, the evaluator may conduct a brief re-evaluation and interview the parents, child(ren), and any other significant persons as determined by the evaluator. This enables the evaluator to acquaint [himself/herself] with developments that succeeded [his/her] report and ensures that [his/her] testimony in court will include the most recent information. This brief re-evaluation will be conducted as long as at least one parent agrees to participate.

12. Deposition of the evaluator may be obtained only upon court order.

13. Regarding Fees:

(a) Except as otherwise provided for herein, fees of the evaluator shall be shared by the parties in the following manner: [name] shall pay _____ percent of the evaluator's fees, expenses, and advance deposit, and [name] shall pay _____ percent of the evaluator's fees, expenses and advance deposit. The deposit shall be provided before the onset of the evaluation. Thereafter, all bills or requests for payment submitted by the evaluator to the parties shall be paid within three (3) days of receipt.

(b) Time spent in interviewing, report preparation, review of records and correspondence, telephone conversations, travel, court preparation, and any other time invested in serving as an evaluator will be billed, and the evaluator's expenses incurred in association with [his/her] role as evaluator shall be reimbursed. These costs may include, but are not limited to, the following: photocopies (\$.10/page), word processing, messenger service, long-distance telephone charges, and express and/or certified mail costs and excess postage to foreign countries.

(c) If either parent fails to provide 24 hours' telephone notice of cancellation of any appointment with the evaluator, that parent shall pay all the evaluator's charges for such missed appointment at the full hourly rate at the discretion of the evaluator.

(d) The parents shall agree to and sign any fee agreement required by the evaluator.

(e) Any objection to the evaluator's bill must be brought to [his/her] attention in written form within ten (10) business days of the billing date; otherwise the billing shall be deemed agreed to.

(f) The parents assign to Dr. [name] a lien in the amount of [his/her] fees.

(g) The [name] Superior Court reserves jurisdiction in any dispute regarding fees or any other provision of this order. Jurisdiction is also reserved to [name] Superior Court to determine the allocation and characterization of any funds [advanced/paid] by either parent and the merits of any dispute over such fees.

(h) The complete cost of the evaluation shall be paid by the parties to the evaluator before the release of the Child Custody Evaluation report.

(i) Payments for postevaluation services including, but not limited to, attendance at the settlement conference, preparation for testimony, and court appearances shall be made in advance in accordance with estimates provided by the evaluator before the rendering of services.

Special arrangements must also be made for payments in advance for travel to other locations to perform evaluations.

(j) If arbitration proceedings or a legal action becomes necessary to enforce any provision of this order, the nonprevailing party shall pay attorneys' fees and costs as may be incurred.

14. The evaluator shall take such steps as are necessary to protect the child(ren)'s therapeutic privilege, including declining to provide any party or counsel with information disclosed by the child(ren) or the child(ren)'s therapist, which would otherwise be privileged. The evaluator shall advise the Court whether (a) minor child(ren)'s therapeutic privilege should be waived by the Court for the purpose of obtaining the testimony of any mental health professional treating (a) minor child(ren) of the parties. Further, in the event that any privileged information or testimony is required by the Court, such information or testimony shall be provided in camera outside the presence of the parties. Counsel for the parties shall be prohibited from disclosing the details of such information or testimony. The evaluator shall not release any raw test data and notes from psychological testing except to a qualified psychologist named by the attorney requesting the information.

15. Pending further order of the Court, the parties are enjoined and restrained from discussing their respective positions on child custody issues, or the contents of the evaluator's written report, with the minor child(ren).

16 If there are restraining orders between parents and if the evaluator deems it important to conjointly interview the parents, it is understood that this order waives the restraining order for that interview.

17. It is a rebuttable presumption that this expert should be appointed to provide the Court with any needed follow-up evaluations if the evaluator is available and willing to perform such updates. Any question about the evaluator's impartiality and consequent ability to perform later evaluations should be raised and determined either during the hearing following the initial evaluation or, if there was no hearing after the original evaluation, through an order to show cause to resolve the issue of possible bias.

<hr/> DATE	<hr/> DATE
<hr/> Mother	<hr/> Father

ORDER

Upon reading the foregoing stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _____

JUDGE/COMMISSIONER/REFEREE

**D. [§200.138] Written Form: Stipulation and Order for
Appointment of Special Master**

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF _____

In re the Marriage of)	
)	
)	NO.
Petitioner)	
)	STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR
)	APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
and)	MASTER
)	
)	
Respondent)	
_____)	

PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES as hereinafter set forth, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:

APPOINTMENT:

1. *[Name, address, and telephone number of Special Master]* is appointed Special Master under [Code of Civil Procedure section 638](#), until the resignation of *[name]* or written agreement of the parties, further court order, or two years from the date of appointment, whichever first occurs.

2. This appointment is based on the expertise of the Special Master as a licensed mental health professional.

3. The Special Master may make orders resolving conflicts between the parents that do not affect the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody and visitation. Each party specifically agrees that the Special Master may make decisions regarding possible conflicts each may have on the following issues, and that such

decisions are effective as orders when made and will continue in effect unless modified or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction:

- ____ Dates and times of pick up and delivery
- ____ Sharing of vacations and holidays
- ____ Method of pick up and delivery
- ____ Transportation to and from visitation
- ____ Participation in child care/daycare and baby sitting
- ____ Bedtime
- ____ Diet
- ____ Clothing
- ____ Recreation
- ____ After-school and enrichment activities
- ____ Discipline
- ____ Health-care management
- ____ Alterations in schedule that do not substantially alter the basic time-share agreement
- ____ Participation in visitation (*e.g.*, significant others, relatives)
- ____ In the case of infants and toddlers, increasing time-share when developmentally appropriate
- ____ Other _____.

4. The Special Master shall have authority to make recommendations on the following issues, which shall be submitted to the Court, which may approve them and enter them as court orders:

- ____ Private school education
- ____ Religion and religious training
- ____ Church attendance
- ____ Large changes in vacation and holiday time-shares

____ Supervision of visitation

____ Time-share changes that do not alter the child(ren)'s primary residence.

____ Appointment of counsel for child(ren)

These recommendations shall be effective when adopted by the Court, and can be reviewed only on a hearing de novo at which the moving party has the burden of proof.

5. The Special Master shall not make any orders that substantially alter the parties' time-sharing arrangements, alter an award of physical custody, alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with *[his/her]* child(ren). These decisions and others relating to the best interest of the child(ren) are reserved to the *[name]* Superior Court for adjudication, and may be presented to the Court by either party on the recommendation of the Special Master in the form of an order to show cause or notice of motion. In an emergency, the Special Master may ask the Court to initiate an order to show cause on its own motion.

6. The Special Master may recommend that child(ren) or the parents participate in adjunct services including physical and psychological examinations, assessments and psychotherapy, and alcohol and drug monitoring and/or testing.

QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY:

7. The Special Master, as an appointed officer of the Court, has quasi-judicial immunity. The Special Master cannot be sued because of *[his/her]* actions in this matter. The Special Master cannot be compelled to testify and is subject to the restrictions of [Evidence Code section 703.5](#). However, the Special Master may choose to testify if the Court so requests, or on application of the Special Master to the Court notifying it of the Special Master's desire to testify. Such testimony shall not constitute a waiver of the Special Master's quasi-judicial immunity.

PROCEDURE:

8. Both parties shall participate in the dispute resolution process as defined by the Special Master and shall be present when so requested by the Special Master. The Special Master may conduct hearings that are informal in nature, by telephone or in person, and need not comply with the rules of evidence. No record need be made, except for the Special Master's written recommendations. The Special Master shall have the authority to determine the protocol of all interviews and sessions

including, in the case of meetings with the parties, the power to determine who attends such meetings.

9. The Special Master may use consultants and/or assistants as necessary to help the Special Master in the performance of the duties contained herein.

DECISIONS:

10. Decisions of the Special Master relating to the items listed in paragraph 3, above, by their very nature are often made in circumstances involving severe time constraints, and, possibly, emergencies; therefore, these decisions may be made orally, but in a fashion communicated to both parties. They are binding when made. In such an event, these decisions should also be communicated to the parties by confirming letter.

WARNING: In signing this agreement, both mother and father should assume that the Special Master's decision on the issues listed in paragraph 3 will be final. Because of time constraints and because of the language of this stipulation, the possibility of obtaining a court order changing a Special Master's decision on these issues is unlikely. Any party challenging the Special Master's decision on any of these issues will have a burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that the Special Master's decision was legally incorrect and/or not in the best interest of the child(ren).

11. If the Special Master makes decisions on issues addressed in paragraph 4, above, these orders should be in writing and filed with the Court. If either party disagrees with any recommendation thus made, [he/she] may make a timely motion requesting a judicial review of the order. In that event, the party challenging the Special Master's recommendation has the burden of proof according to the law.

COMMUNICATION WITH SPECIAL MASTER:

12. The parties and their attorneys shall have the right to initiate or receive ex parte communication with the Special Master. Any party may initiate contact in writing with the Special Master, provided that copies are given to opposing counsel simultaneously.

13. The Special Master may communicate ex parte with the judge, at the discretion of the Special Master and the judge. Such communications shall be made only after giving notice to both parties, provided, however, that notice may be excused if notice would frustrate the very purpose of the communication. If the Special Master communicates with the judge without having given notice, [he/she] shall notify the judge of that fact and of [his/her] reasons for not giving notice.

14. The parties shall provide all reasonable records, documentation, and information requested by the Special Master.

15. No physician-patient or therapist-patient relationship and/or privilege is created by this stipulation.

FEES:

16. The Special Master's fees are: *[amount]* per hour. Time spent in interviewing, report preparation, review of records and correspondence, telephone conversation, travel, court preparation, and any other time invested in connection with serving as Special Master will also be billed at the *[amount]* hourly rate. The Special Master's fee for court appearances and settlement conference is *[amount]* per session while in court and at the settlement conference and *[amount]* per hour travel time to and from *[his/her]* office. The Special Master shall have the right to allocate payment of *[his/her]* fees at a percentage different from the above if *[he/she]* believes the need for *[his/her]* services is attributable to the conduct and/or intransigence of one party. The Special Master may require an advance deposit in an amount to be agreed on by *[him/her]* and the parties.

17. The Special Master shall be reimbursed for any expenses *[he/she]* incurs in association with *[his/her]* role as Special Master. These costs may include, but are not limited to, the following: photocopies, messenger service, long-distance telephone charges, express and/or certified mail costs and excess postage to foreign countries, parking, tolls, mileage, travel expenses, and word processing.

18. Any objection to the Special Master's bills must be brought to *[his/her]* attention in written form within *[number]* business days of the billing date; otherwise the billing shall be deemed agreed to.

19. In the event that arbitration proceedings or a legal action become necessary to enforce any provision of this order, the nonprevailing party shall pay attorneys' fees and costs as may be incurred.

20. The Court reserves jurisdiction in the family law action to enforce the provisions of this stipulation.

21. Except as otherwise provided herein, the fees of the Special Master shall be shared by the parties in the following manner: *[Name]* shall pay _____ percent of the Special Master's fees, expense and advance deposit, and *[name]* shall pay _____ percent of the Special Master's fees, expenses, and advance deposit.

22. Telephone calls to the Special Master by either party are part of the process and appropriately paid for by the parties according to their percentage share as ordered.

23. If either party fails to provide 24 hours' telephone notice of cancellation of any appointment with the Special Master, such party shall pay all the Special Master's charges of such missed appointment at the full hourly rate, at the discretion of the Special Master.

GRIEVANCES:

24. The Special Master may be disqualified on any of the grounds applicable to the removal of a judge, referee, or arbitrator.

25. Neither party may initiate court proceedings for the removal of the Special Master or to bring to the Court's attention any grievances regarding the performance or actions of the Special Master without meeting and conferring with the Special Master in an effort to resolve the grievance.

26. Neither party shall complain about the Special Master to the Special Master's licensing board without first meeting and conferring with the Special Master in an effort to resolve the grievance.

27. The Court shall reserve jurisdiction to determine if either or both parties and/or the Special Master shall ultimately be responsible for any portion or all of the Special Master's time and costs spent in responding to any grievance and the Special Master's attorneys' fees, if any.

28. If either party or the Special Master believes that there exists a grievance between them with respect to this stipulation that cannot be resolved, either party or the Special Master can move the Court for relief from this stipulation, after complying with paragraph 25 above.

RESIGNATION OF SPECIAL MASTER:

29. The Special Master may resign any time [he/she] determines the resignation to be in the best interest of the child(ren), or the Special Master is unable to serve out [his/her] term, upon thirty (30) days' written notice to the parties.

<p>_____</p> <p>Mother</p>	<p>_____</p> <p>Father</p>
<p>Approved as to Form: _____</p>	
<p>_____</p> <p>Attorney for Mother</p>	<p>_____</p> <p>Attorney for Father</p>
<p>_____ Special Master</p>	

ORDER

Upon reading the foregoing stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _____
JUDGE/COMMISSIONER/REFEREE

Appendix: Move-Away Flow Chart
 Prepared by Hon. James M. Mize, County of Sacramento




Table of Statutes

CALIFORNIA

CIVIL CODE

4600 (former)
200.59

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

395(a) 200.5, 200.27
397.5 200.5, 200.27
415.10 200.69
527.6 200.52
527.8 200.52
638 200.138
638(a) 200.106
638(b) 200.106
639 200.106
639(d) 200.106
639(d)(6)(A) 200.106
639(e) 200.106
2032 200.97

EVIDENCE CODE

703.5 200.138
730 200.97, 200.136–200.137

765(b) 200.51
1040 200.78, 200.81
1107 200.57

FAMILY CODE

7810 200.11
7810(c) 200.11
1815 200.74
1816 200.97
3000 et seq 200.9
3002–3007 200.30
3003 200.30, 200.32
3003–3007 200.30
3004 200.30, 200.32
3006 200.30–200.31
3007 200.30–200.31
3010(b) 200.134
3011 200.6, 200.33–200.34,
200.39, 200.43, 200.47–
200.48, 200.75, 200.79,
200.123
3011(a) 200.35

3011(a)–(d) 200.6, 200.34	3027(b) 200.46
3011(b) 200.43, 200.100	3027.1(a) 200.46
3011(b)(1) 200.40–200.41	3027.1(b) 200.46
3011(b)(2) 200.40–200.41	3027.5(a) 200.46
3011(b)(3) 200.40–200.42	3030(a) 200.55
3011(c) 200.36	3030(b) 200.56
3011(d) 200.37–200.38	3030(c) 200.57
3011(e)(1) 200.37, 200.40	3030(c)(1)–(3) 200.57
3011(e)(2) 200.37, 200.40	3031(a) 200.54
3020 200.47–200.48, 200.75, 200.79	3031(b) 200.54
3020–3032 200.89	3031(c) 200.54
3020(a) 200.35	3040 200.48
3020(b) 200.36, 200.45–200.47, 200.122, 200.132	3040–3048 200.89
3020(c) 200.47	3040(a)(1) 200.6, 200.33, 200.45, 200.47–200.48, 200.58
3021 200.9, 200.68	3040(a)(2) 200.48
3022 200.9, 200.114, 200.134	3040(a)(3) 200.48
3022.5 200.46	3040(b) 200.48
3023(a) 200.133	3041 200.59
3023(b) 200.133	3041(a) 200.59
3025 200.31	3041(b) 200.60
3027(a) 200.46	3041(c) 200.59–200.60

3041(d)	3060
200.60	200.28
3041.5(a)	3061
200.39	200.28
3042(a)	3062(a)
200.50, 200.124	200.29
3042(b)	3062(b)
200.51	200.29
3043	3063
200.48	200.29
3044	3064
200.43	200.29
3044(a)	3080
200.43–200.45	200.33
3044(b)	3080–3089
200.45	200.89
3044(c)	3081
200.43	200.33
3044(d)	3082
200.44	200.6, 200.33
3044(e)	3083
200.44	200.6, 200.33
3044(f)	3084
200.43	200.6, 200.33
3046	3085
200.36	200.33
3046(a)	3086
200.52	200.6, 200.33
3046(b)	3087
200.52	200.33, 200.129
3046(c)	3087–3088
200.52	200.114
3048	3089
200.6, 200.107–200.108	200.6, 200.33
3048(b)(1)	3100–3104
200.107–200.108	200.89
3048(b)(2)	3100(a)
200.108	200.61, 200.63, 200.65
3048(b)(3)	3100(b)
200.108	200.54
3048(b)(4)	3100(c)
200.108	200.54
3048(d)	3100(d)
200.107	200.54

3101	3104(e)
200.65	200.67, 200.69
3101–3104	3104(f)
200.63–200.64	200.67, 200.69
3101(b)	3104(g)
200.65	200.69
3101(c)	3104(h)
200.65	200.69
3102	3104(i)(1)
200.64, 200.66–200.67	200.69
3102(a)	3104(i)(2)(A)
200.66	200.69
3102(b)	3104(i)(2)(B))
200.66	200.69
3102(c)	3110
200.66	200.96
3103	3110 et seq
200.67, 200.69	200.90
3103(b)	3110.5(a):
200.68	200.97
3103(c)	3111
200.68	200.97
3103(d)	3111(a)
200.67	200.96, 200.98
3103(e)	3111(c)
200.68	200.98
3103(f)	3112
200.67–200.68	200.101
3103(g)(1)	3113
200.68	200.99
3103(g)(2)(A)	3114
200.68	200.98
3103(g)(2)(B)	3115
200.68	200.98
3104	3117(b)
200.67, 200.69	200.98
3104(a)	3118
200.69	200.100
3104(b)	3118(a)
200.69	200.100
3104(c)	3118(a)(1)
200.69	200.100
3104(d)	3118(a)(2)
200.69	200.100

3118(f)	3153(b)
200.100	200.105
3120	3160
200.9	200.74
3128	3161
200.21	200.75
3130	3161(b)
200.109, 200.111	200.79
3130–3134.5	3162
200.111	200.91
3130–3135	3162(a)
200.109	200.91
3131	3163
200.110–200.111	200.91
3132	3164
200.109–200.110	200.74
3133	3170(a)
200.111	200.74
3134(b)	3170(b)
200.112	200.74
3134.5(a)	3171(a)
200.111	200.74
3134.5(b)	3171(b)
200.111	200.74
3135	3172
200.111	200.74
3140	3173
200.113	200.74
3140(a)	3175
200.113	200.80
3140(b)	3176(a):
200.113	200.80
3140(c)	3176(b)
200.113	200.80
3150	3176(c)
200.98	200.80
3150–3153	3177
200.85, 200.135	200.81
3150(a)	3178
200.102	200.82
3151(a)	3179
200.104, 200.135	200.89
3153(a)	3180
200.105	200.79

3180(a)	3190(b)
200.83	200.92
3181(a)	3190(c)
200.86	200.95
3181(b)	3190(d)
200.75	200.92
3182(a)	3190(e)
200.88	200.92
3182(b)	3191
200.88	200.93
3183	3192
200.90	200.94–200.95
3183(a)	3200
200.76	200.72
3183(b)	3200 et seq
200.90	200.70
3183(c)	3400 et seq
200.84	200.12, 200.108, 200.111
3184	3402(a)
200.78, 200.85	200.22
3185–3186	3402(a)(1)
200.77	200.17
3185(a)	3402(a)(2)
200.90	200.17
3185(b)	3402(a)(3)
200.90	200.17
3186(a)	3402(a)(4)
200.6, 200.89	200.17
3186(b)	3402(c)
200.89	200.13
3186(c)	3402(c)–(d)
200.89	200.12
3188	3402(g)
200.78, 200.80, 200.84–	200.14
200.85	3402(m)
3188(a)	200.14
200.78	3408 (former)
3188(b)	200.21
200.78	3421
3188(c)	200.18, 200.23
200.78	3421–3423
3190(a)	200.21
200.92	3421–3424
	200.12

3421–3430	3427(c)
200.19	200.20
3421(a)	3427(d)
200.2, 200.13	200.20
3421(a)(1)	3427(e)
200.14–200.16	200.20
3421(a)(2)	3428
200.15–200.16, 200.24	200.15–200.16, 200.21
3421(a)(3)	3428(a)
200.16	200.21
3421(b)	3428(b)
200.13	200.21
3421(c)	3428(d)
200.13	200.21
3422	3429
200.17, 200.23–200.24	200.19
3422(a)	3436(b)
200.23	200.19
3423	3438(c)
200.4, 200.17, 200.23	200.21
3424	4062
200.13, 200.19, 200.21, 200.23–200.24	200.95
3424(a)	4062–4063
200.3, 200.22	200.95
3424(b)	6200 et seq
200.22	200.9
3424(c)	6203
200.22	200.41, 200.44, 200.57
3424(d)	6211
200.22	200.21, 200.44, 200.92
3426(a)	6218
200.19	200.65, 200.68–200.69, 200.86–200.87, 200.94, 200.99
3426(b)	6300 et seq
200.19, 200.24	200.52
3426(c)	6303(a)
200.25	200.87
3427	6303(c)
200.15–200.17, 200.19, 200.21, 200.24, 200.26	200.87–200.88
3427(a)	6320
200.20	200.41, 200.43
3427(b)	6323(c)
200.20	200.37, 200.40

7002
200.134

7050(b)
200.134

7122
200.134

7501(a)
200.118

7600 et seq
200.9

7822
200.52

17404
200.9

PENAL CODE

136.2
200.52

189
200.57

243(e)
200.44

261
200.44, 200.56

262
200.44

273a
200.55

273d
200.55

273.5
200.44

278.7
200.107

290
200.55

422
200.44

646.9
200.44

647.6
200.55

1203.097(c)
200.45

11165.2
200.29

11165.6
200.41

11166
200.29

PROBATE CODE

1500 et seq
200.48

WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE

300 et seq
200.10

302(c)
200.10

302(d)
200.10

304
200.10

360.6
200.11

360.6(c)
200.11

ACTS BY POPULAR NAME

Domestic Violence Prevention
Act

200.9, 200.52, 200.65,
200.68–200.69

Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (former)

200.21

Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA)

200.12, 200.108, 200.111

Uniform Parentage Act

200.9

CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT

5.210
200.91

5.210(c)(2)
200.82

5.210(d)
200.91

5.210 (d)–(e)
200.91

5.210(e)(3)
200.83

5.210(e)(8)(A)
200.6, 200.89

5.210(e)(8)(B)
200.90

5.210(f)
200.91

5.210(g)
200.91

5.220(b)
200.97

5.220(c)
200.98

5.220(c)(1)
200.96

5.220(g)
200.97

5.225
200.97

5.230
200.97

244
200.6

1429.1(a)
200.10

3110.5(a)
200.97

5220(h)(10)
200.96

Standards of Judicial Administration

20.5(a)
200.102

20.5(b))
200.103

20.5(d)
200.102

26.2
200.72

26.2(a)
200.72

26.2(b)
200.72

26.2(c)
200.71–200.72

26.2(c)(1)
200.72

26.2(c)(2)
200.72

26.2(c)(3)
200.72

26.2(d)
200.73

26.2(d)–(n)
200.73

26.2(f)
200.73

26.2(k)
200.73

LOCAL SUPERIOR COURT RULES**Los Angeles**

14.3
200.77

San Francisco

Uniform rule 11.22
200.77

UNITED STATES**UNITED STATES CODE**

Title 25

1901 et seq

[200.11](#)

1903

[200.11](#)

1911(a)

[200.11](#)

1911(b)–(c)

[200.11](#)

1912(a)

[200.11](#)

Title 28

1738A

[200.12](#)

1728A(c)(2)(A)–(D)

[200.13](#)

Title 42

11601 et seq

[200.108](#)**ACTS BY POPULAR NAME**

Indian Child Welfare Act

[200.11–200.12](#)Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA)[200.12](#)

Table of Cases

- Abargil, Marriage of (2003) 106
CA4th 1294, 131 CR2d 429:
§200.131
- Abrams, Marriage of (2003) 105
CA4th 979, 130 CR2d 16:
§200.121
- Adoption of Matthew B. (1991)
232 CA3d 1239, 284 CR 18:
§§200.34, 200.49
- B.G., In re (1974) 11 C3d 679,
114 CR2d 444: §200.59
- Biallas, Marriage of (1998) 65
CA4th 755, 76 CR2d 717:
§§200.118, 200.120, 200.130
- Birdsall, Marriage of (1988) 197
CA3d 1024, 243 CR 287:
§200.58
- Birnbaum, Marriage of (1989)
211 CA3d 1508, 260 CR 210:
§200.117
- Brody v Kroll (1996) 45 CA4th
1732, 53 CR2d 280: §200.130
- Bryant, Marriage of (2001) 91
CA4th 789, 110 CR2d 791:
§§200.119, 200.132
- Burchard v Garay (1986) 42 C3d
531, 229 CR 800: §§200.49,
200.58, 200.115–200.116
- Burgess, Marriage of (1996) 13
C4th 25, 51 CR2d 444:
§§200.115, 200.118–200.120,
200.122–200.127, 200.129–
200.130, 200.132
- Campos, Marriage of (2003) 108
CA4th 839, 134 CR2d 300:
§200.120
- Carney, Marriage of (1979) 24
C3d 725, 157 CR 383:
§§200.58, 200.115
- Coil v Coil (1962) 211 CA2d
411, 27 CR 378: §200.50
- Desiree B., In re (1992) 8 CA4th
286, 10 CR2d 254: §200.10
- Donaldson, Guardianship of:
(1986) 178 CA3d 477, 223 CR
707: §200.134
- Dunn, Marriage of (2002) 103
CA4th 345, 126 CR2d 636:
§200.115
- Edlund & Hales, Marriage of
(1998) 66 CA4th 1454, 78
CR2d 671: §200.119
- Fenn v Sherriff (2003) 109
CA4th 1466, 1 CR3d 185:
§200.66
- Fewel v Fewel (1943) 23 C2d
431, 144 P2d 592: §200.98
- Goodarzirad, Marriage of (1986)
185 CA3d 1020, 230 CR 203:
§200.114
- Guardianship of Donaldson:
(1986) 178 CA3d 477, 223 CR
707: §200.134
- Haywood v Superior Court
(2000) 77 CA4th 949, 92
CR2d 182: §200.21
- Herbst v Swan (2002) 102 CA4th
813, 125 CR2d 836: §200.64
- Hoversten v Superior Court
(1999) 74 CA4th 636, 88
CR2d 197: §200.62
- In re B.G. (1974) 11 C3d 679,
114 CR2d 444.: §200.59
- In re Desiree B. (1992) 8 CA4th
286, 10 CR2d 254: §200.10
- James W., Marriage of (2003)
114 CA4th 68, 7 CR3d 461:
§200.65
- Kyle O. v Donald R. (2000) 85
CA4th 848, 102 CR2d 476:
§§200.64, 200.66

LaMusga, Marriage of (2004) 32
C4th 1072, 12 CR3d 356:

§§200.120, 200.127–200.128

Lasich, Marriage of (2002) 99
CA4th 702, 121 CR2d 356:

§§200.130, 200.132

Lewin, Marriage of (1986) 186
CA3d 1482, 231 CR 433:

§200.117

Lewis & Goetz, Marriage of
(1988) 203 CA3d 514, 250 CR
30: §200.65

Lloyd, Marriage of (1997) 55
CA4th 216, 64 CR2d 37:

§200.106

Lopez v Martinez (2000) 85
CA4th 279, 102 CR2d 71:

§§200.67, 200.69

Loyd, Marriage of (2003) 106
CA4th 754, 131 CR2d 80:

§200.58

Marckwardt v Superior Court
(1984) 150 CA3d 471, 198 CR
41: §200.65

Marriage of _____.
See name of party.

Matthew B., Adoption of (1991)
232 CA3d 1239, 284 CR 18:

§§200.34, 200.49

McGinnis, Marriage of (1992) 7
CA4th 473, 9 CR2d 182:

§200.96

McLaughlin v Superior Court
(1983) 140 CA3d 473, 189 CR
479: §200.76

McLoren, Marriage of (1988)
202 CA3d 108, 247 CR 897:

§200.115

Mehlmauer, Marriage of (1976)
60 CA3d 104, 131 CR 325:

§200.50

Montenegro v Diaz (2001) 26
C4th 249, 109 CR2d 575:

§200.116

Murga, Marriage of (1980) 103
CA3d 498, 163 CR 79:

§200.58

Nadler v Superior Court (1967)
255 CA2d 523, 63 CR 352:

§200.58

Palmore v Sidoti (1984) 466 US
429, 104 S Ct 1879, 80 L Ed
2d 421: §200.58

Perry, Marriage of (1998) 61
CA4th 295, 71 CR2d 499:

§§200.68, 200.105

Punsly v Ho (2001) 87 CA4th
1099, 105 CR2d 139: §200.64

Rose & Richardson, Marriage of
(2002) 102 CA4th 941, 126
CR2d 45: §200.116

Ross & Kelley, Marriage of
(2003) 114 CA4th 130, 7

CR3d 287: §200.63

Rosson, Marriage of (1986) 178
CA3d 1094, 224 CR 250:

§§200.50–200.51, 200.76,
200.81

Ruisi v Thieriot (1997) 53 CA4th
1197, 62 CR2d 766:

§§200.106, 200.122

Settlemyre v Superior Court
(2003) 105 CA4th 666, 129

CR2d 560: §200.106

Slayton, Marriage of (2001) 86
CA4th 653, 103 CR2d 545:

§§200.29, 200.50–200.51,
200.58, 200.88

Speelman v Superior Court
(1983) 152 CA3d 124, 199 CR

784: §200.115

Travis C. (1991) 233 CA3d 492,
284 CR 469: §200.10

Troxel v Granville (2000) 530
US 57, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L

Ed 2d 49: §§200.63–200.64

Urband, Marriage of (1977) 68
CA3d 796, 137 CR 433:

§200.58

Wellman, Marriage of (1980)
104 CA3d 992, 164 CR 148:

§200.58

Whealon, Marriage of (1997) 53
CA4th 132, 61 CR2d 559:

§§200.125, 200.129–200.130,
200.132

White v Jacobs (1988) 198 CA3d
122, 243 CR 597: §200.67

Williams, Marriage of (2001) 88
CA4th 808, 105 CR2d 923:

§200.53

Zasueta v Zasueta (2002) 102
CA4th 1242, 126 CR2d 245:

§200.64

Zierenberg, Marriage of (1992)
11 CA4th 1436, 16 CR2d 238:

§200.12